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INTRODUCTION
The manner in which information is shared has changed dramatically since
the late 1960s, when the Supreme Court issued two seminal free speech rulings: Pickering v. Board of Education and Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District.1 In Pickering, the Court held in favor of a teacher
who had written a letter to the local newspaper that was critical of his school
board.2 The Court held that teachers generally have a right to speak as citizens
on matters of public concern.3 The Pickering Court, however, stipulated that
the speech rights of teachers are not unlimited; they must be balanced against
the rights of the state as an employer to efficiently run the schools.4 In Tinker,
1

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Pickering v. Bd. of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). Pickering and Tinker represented radical departures from the
previously held notions about the extent to which the Constitution protects the interests of
teachers or pupils in public schools. Up until Tinker, the dominant view was that, because
educators acted in place of parents when students are at school, they naturally enjoy the
same unfettered right to discipline students that parents do. See State v. Pendergrass, 19
N.C. 365, 366 (1837). In State v. Pendergrass, the Court stated: “[t]he teacher is the substitute of the parent” and “is invested with his power.” Id. As to the educators’ relationship
with their state employers, the right/privilege distinction, articulated by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in 1892, had long been a significant barrier to advancing the free speech rights
of public educators. See McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220 (1892).
In McAuliffe, a case that dealt with a policeman who had been fired for engaging in political
speech, Justice Holmes summed up the right/privilege distinction as follows: “The petitioner
may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.” Id.
2 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574–75.
3 Id. at 572.
4 Watt Lesley Black, Jr., When Teachers Go Viral: Balancing Institutional Efficacy Against
the First Amendment Rights of Public Educators in the Age of Facebook, 82 MO. L. REV.
51, 90 (2017) (see flow chart on page 90, which describes the Pickering Balancing test in
terms of six considerations: “Did the employee’s speech: [1] breach confidentiality[;] [2]
undermine the superior/subordinate relationship[;] [3] interfere with the orderly operations
of the school[;] [4] interfere with his/her ability to continue to function effectively on the
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the Court held in favor of students who had worn black armbands to school in
protest of the Vietnam War, holding that students have First Amendment rights
in school so long as their speech does not cause material or substantial disruption or an invasion of the rights of other students.5
The student speech in Tinker had no negative impact on the work of the
school, nor did it interfere in any way with the rights of others.6 The same is
true of Pickering’s letter to the editor, which triggered very little public reaction outside of the school board members who felt personally targeted.7 In
2019, it is much less likely that such speech will go unnoticed. Unlike in 1969,
virtually everyone now has the means to quickly and easily distribute expressive content throughout their communities and far beyond. Electronic speech
has the potential to “go viral,” reaching an audience far larger than the speaker
may have ever intended. The expanded reach of student or educator speech has
exponentially increased its potential to cause disruption to the school environment.
This enhanced ability of students and educators to broadcast their expression online has posed unprecedented legal and practical challenges. The public
launch of Facebook in 2006 triggered an expansion in the use of social media,
which is now widespread among all ages and sectors of society.8 According to
a 2018 Pew Research study, 95 percent of American “teens have access to a
smartphone” and 45 percent of the teens surveyed claim to be online “almost
constantly.”9 Eighty-five percent of the teens surveyed are regular users of
YouTube, followed closely in use by Instagram and Snapchat.10 The improved
technology has allowed student speech to be more influential both on matters
subject to serious debate11 and on cruel or disparaging speech, such as cyberbullying.12 The modern school administrator has been forced to struggle with
the resultant fallout.
Adults are also prevalent users of social media. Sixty-eight percent of
American adults are on Facebook, with even heavier usage among young

job[;] [5] [constitute a] knowingly or recklessly ma[d]e false statement[][;] [or] [6] provide
evidence of a lack of employee’s fitness for duty”).
5 Tinker, 391 U.S. at 504, 508.
6 Id. at 509.
7 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570.
8 See Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2019), http://www.pewinternet.org/
fact-sheet/social-media/ [https://perma.cc/843N-FTQY].
9 MONICA ANDERSON & JINGJING JIANG, TEENS, SOCIAL MEDIA & TECHNOLOGY 2 (2018).
10 Id.
11 Gary Younge, What Happened Next? How Teenage Shooting Survivor David Hogg Became a Political Leader, GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/news/
2018/dec/12/gun-control-activist-david-hogg-parkland-people-dying
[https://perma.cc/WV8Q-SHT5].
12 See Monica Anderson, A Majority of Teens Have Experienced Some Form of Cyberbullying, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 27, 2018), http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/09/27/a-majority-ofteens-have-experienced-some-form-of-cyberbullying/ [https://perma.cc/W36E-NL3X].
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adults in their twenties—the age range of many new teachers.13 Social media
use by teachers has made their private lives, which have always been subject to
heightened scrutiny relative to the general public, more publicly accessible
than ever before.14 Public confidence in the “fitness” of those who work most
closely with their children is essential to the effective functioning of a school
district and, when an educator expresses himself or herself online in a controversial manner, schools may worry that, absent corrective action against that
employee, trust may be eroded within their communities. This often presents a
conundrum to practicing school administrators who are seeking to balance the
efficacy of their school systems against the legitimate rights of their employees.
In matters involving both students and school employees, the Supreme
Court has given a rudimentary roadmap for resolving the conflicts, but the
Court’s precedents do not easily translate to the digital age. School administrators lack a consistent framework for determining when an employee’s online
speech can provide the basis for negative employment action. As to matters involving students, the existing body of case law doesn’t provide school administrators a sufficient level of certainty that their disciplinary decisions will
strike the appropriate balance between the maintenance of discipline at school
and respect for students’ First Amendment rights.
This article examines the developing law around the First Amendment and
electronic speech in public education and identifies the important themes pertaining to both student and educator speech. It also highlights emerging issues
and their implications for educational administrators as they wrestle to make
legally and ethically defensible decisions related to discipline of both students
and school personnel.
Part I will review the relevant Supreme Court precedent regarding the First
Amendment rights of both students and teachers in public schools, from the
historic Pickering and Tinker decisions in 1968 and 1969 through the most recent decisions related to student and public employee expression. Part II will
focus on public employee expression and how the lower federal courts have
applied Supreme Court precedent in cases involving electronic speech. Part III
will focus on important developments in lower federal courts as they have attempted to apply Supreme Court precedent to cases involving student speech.
Part IV will pull together themes that emerge across both student and educator
13

AARON SMITH & MONICA ANDERSON, SOCIAL MEDIA USE IN 2018 2 (2018); Pew Research Ctr., supra note 8.
14 See Marka B. Fleming et al., Morals Clauses for Educators in Secondary and Postsecondary Schools: Legal Applications and Constitutional Concerns, 2009 B.Y.U. EDUC. &
L.J. 67, 70 (2009) (arguing that teachers are so influential that parents, legislators, and the
general citizenry historically held expectations that they “serve as good examples for their
young charges.”); see also Mike Simpson, Social Networking Nightmares: Cyberspeak No
Evil, NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, http://www.nea.org/home/38324.htm [https://perma.cc/J3X7PF8X] (last visited Nov. 17, 2019) (suggesting that the popularity of social media has “engendered a prurient interest in teachers’ ‘private’ lives”).
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speech cases and examine the implications for practice in both the student and
employee management realms.
I.

THE SUPREME COURT, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS

A. The Public-School Educator’s Speech Rights
The Supreme Court first waded into the issue of First Amendment rights
inside the public schools in 1968.15 Marvin Pickering was a public high school
teacher who was terminated as a result of writing a letter to the editor of a local
paper.16 Pickering’s letter was critical of the board’s use of funds from a 1961
bond election and also contained accusations that the superintendent had inappropriately coerced employees’ support of a local school-related referendum.17
The Board of Trustees believed that Pickering had cast aspersions on their
“motives, honesty, integrity, truthfulness, responsibility and competence.”18 As
a result, they terminated Pickering’s employment.19
The Court ruled in Pickering that, while educators do have First Amendment rights to speak as citizens on matters of public concern, the state also has
the right as a public employer to provide government services with basic efficiency.20 When an educator engages in speech that is sufficiently disruptive to
school business, then the balance tilts in favor of the employer.21
The Court considered three circumstances under which school administrators might have been able to impose discipline without violating the First
Amendment. First, had Pickering’s letter breached confidentiality or undermined important workplace relationships, he might legally have been subjected
to job-related discipline.22 But Pickering did not report directly to, or regularly
interact with, board members or the superintendent; therefore the Court did not
find that his letter interfered with any working relationships.23 Second, had the
letter interfered with school operations or damaged Pickering’s ability to continue to effectively function in his job, he also could have been subject to discipline.24 With the exception of the board members themselves, however, most
in the community had greeted Pickering’s letter with “massive apathy and total
disbelief.”25 Outside of upsetting the superintendent and trustees, the letter had
no impact on Pickering’s job effectiveness or to the functioning of the school

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968).
Id.
Id. at 564, 576.
Id. at 567.
Id. at 563.
Id. at 568.
See Black, supra note 4, at 80.
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570–73.
Id. at 570.
Id. at 572–73.
Id. at 570 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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system in general.26 Finally, had Pickering knowingly shared false information,
he might have been subject to discipline.27 But while the letter contained some
inaccurate information, there was no evidence presented that Pickering recklessly made false claims.28 Under the particular circumstances, Pickering’s letter survived what has come to be known as the Pickering Balancing Test.29
In 1983, the Court issued another ruling that would impact the First
Amendment expression rights of public educators. In Connick v Myers, the
Court held that not all expressive activities of public employees merit First
Amendment protection.30 Connick v. Myers did not involve an educator; instead it arose out of an employment dispute in an urban district attorney’s office.31 Sheila Myers worked as an assistant district attorney in New Orleans.32
In response to a pending transfer to another section of the criminal court, Myers prepared and distributed a survey to approximately fifteen other assistant
district attorneys, soliciting input on office morale, confidence in supervisors,
and whether there should be an official “grievance committee.”33 Upon learning that Myers had distributed the survey, District Attorney Harry Connick
terminated her.34 Myers successfully argued in federal district court that the
termination violated her First Amendment free speech rights.35 Upon appeal to
the Fifth Circuit, the district court’s decision was affirmed.36
The Supreme Court, however, viewed this case much differently than the
lower courts. In the Court’s view, Myers’s survey was notably different from
Pickering’s letter in that it addressed matters almost exclusively of private interest.37 If employee speech does not address a matter of public concern, an
employer’s decision to impose discipline should not be a judicial concern.38
But, in addition to distinguishing a difference between the public and private
nature of the content of Myers’s speech, the Court also noted a significant difference related to the capacity of the speakers in these two cases. In contrast to
Marvin Pickering, who wrote his letter as a private citizen, Myers was speaking in the capacity of an employee when she distributed a work-related survey

26

Id. at 567, 572–73.
Id. at 569.
28 Id. at 572.
29 Joseph O. Oluwole, The Pickering Balancing Test and Public Employment-Free Speech
Jurisprudence: The Approaches of Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 133,
135 (2008).
30 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983).
31 Id. at 140.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 140–41.
34 Id. at 141.
35 Id. at 141–42.
36 Id. at 142.
37 Id. at 154. It is important to note that, while Myers was speaking in the capacity of an
employee, she was not actually doing her job when she was speaking.
38 Id. at 146.
27
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throughout her office.39 Writing for the majority in Connick, Justice Byron
White explained:
[W]hen a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent
the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in
which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency
allegedly in reaction to the employee’s behavior.40

The Court gave minimal guidance on the issue of how a public employer
should determine whether an employee is speaking as a citizen on a matter of
public concern: “Whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public
concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given
statement. . . .”41 The Court concluded that the content of Myers’s survey dealt
primarily with private workplace concerns.42 With respect to form and context,
the Court focused heavily on Myers’s motivation, which it viewed as primarily
self-serving.43 Rather than seeking to blow the whistle on incompetent or corrupt practices within the district attorney’s office, Myers was acting out of her
dissatisfaction with her impending transfer, hoping to “gather ammunition for
another round of controversy with her superiors.”44
The Court’s decision in Connick set up two distinct categories of speech:
that of an employee on a matter of private interest and that of a citizen on a
matter of public concern. And yet the Court was vague in terms of how to distinguish between these two categories. In effect, the Court’s decision in Connick significantly narrowed the scope of public employee speech rights, creating a “threshold test” through which employee speech must pass before it is
evaluated under Pickering. As a result, employee speech that fails to meet this
test of public concern is no longer under the umbrella of First Amendment protection.45
In 1987, the Court clarified what qualifies as a public concern under Connick. In Rankin v. McPherson,46 Deputy Constable Ardith McPherson was
fired after she was overheard making a distasteful remark regarding the attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan.47 When she learned that
Reagan had been shot, McPherson commented to her boyfriend, who also was
39

Id. at 154.
Id. at 147 (emphasis added).
41 Id. at 147–48.
42 Id. at 154.
43 Id. at 148.
44 Id.
45 See Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444, 449 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985), in which the Sixth Circuit relied upon Connick in order to rule
against a high school guidance counselor for revealing her bisexuality to co-workers, despite
a lack of evidence that her revelation created any type of disruption. The circuit court held
that the speech was of a personal interest and, under Connick, unprotected. Id. The Supreme
Court denied certiorari.
46 Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
47 Id. at 381–82.
40
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employed by the constable: “[I]f they go for him again, I hope they get him.”48
A co-worker reported the comment to McPherson’s supervisor, and she was
fired.49 The Court held that McPherson’s speech dealt with the life and death
of the president, a matter of inherent public concern, and therefore protected by
the First Amendment.50
Perhaps more interestingly, a concurring opinion in Rankin raised the possibility that Connick should not disqualify purely private employee speech
from First Amendment protection. Justice Lewis Powell, in his concurrence,
argued that the Connick “public concern” test was unnecessary and inappropriate because McPherson’s remark was part of a purely private conversation between her and her boyfriend.51 McPherson could have had no way of reasonably knowing that her comment would have reached anyone other than the other
party involved in the conversation. Further, there was little likelihood that her
remark would be disruptive in any way. “The risk that a single, offhand comment directed to only one other worker will lower morale, disrupt the work
force, or otherwise undermine the mission of the office borders on the fanciful,” explained Justice Powell.52
In 1995, the Court dealt with a case involving an ex ante restriction on the
speech rights of public employees and chose to side-step Connick altogether.
United States v. National Treasury Employees’ Union (NTEU) involved a challenge to a section of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, which banned federal employees from accepting compensation for writing articles or making speeches.53 The provision was intended to be an ethical safeguard, protecting the
integrity of both government workers and the government itself.54 The parties
challenging the prohibition comprised individual employees and large unions
who argued that the measure would have a chilling impact on their private
speech, an argument with which the Court agreed.55 “With few exceptions,”
Justice Stevens explained, “the content of respondents’ messages has nothing
to do with their jobs and does not even arguably have any adverse impact on
the efficiency of the offices in which they work.”56 Thus, the Act violated the
First Amendment rights of federal employees.
In 2004, the Court once again relied on Connick in upholding the termination of a police officer in San Diego after he refused an order to stop producing, starring in, and selling adult videos online.57 The officer sold his videos on

48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

Id. at 381.
Id. at 381–82.
Id. at 385–87.
Id. at 393 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id.
United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emp.’s Union, 513 U.S. 454, 457 (1995).
Id. at 472.
Id. at 465, 469.
Id. at 465.
City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 78 (2004).
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the “adults-only” section of Ebay.58 He also sold police-related items, one of
which was an official San Diego police uniform, something that ultimately
caught the attention of department officials.59
The department initiated a termination proceeding after the officer refused
to fully comply with a directive to cease and desist his online enterprise.60 The
officer filed suit in federal court alleging a violation of his rights under the
First Amendment, but the district court dismissed his case, holding that his
speech was not of a public concern, and therefore unprotected.61 The Ninth
Circuit reversed, however, relying upon the NTEU decision to argue that this
was purely private and non-disruptive speech unrelated to his job duties.62 The
Court viewed the officer’s online business as essentially different than the
speech at issue in NTEU, which was unrelated to, and had no impact on, the
work or business of the employer.63 In contrast, the officer’s videos were connected to his work as a policeman “in a way injurious to his employer.”64 Videos depicting a police officer “performing indecent acts while in the course of
official duties” would cause anyone who might view them to develop serious
doubts with regard to the professionalism and mission of the San Diego police
department.65
In the 2006 decision of Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Court was forced to grapple with a type of speech that it felt didn’t fit neatly into the dichotomy spelled
out in Pickering and Connick. Like Connick, the genesis of Garcetti was an
employment dispute in an urban district attorney’s office.66 Richard Ceballos
was a deputy assistant district attorney in Los Angeles County.67 As “calendar
deputy,” Ceballos would review the work of other attorneys in the office at the
request of defense attorneys.68 While acting on one such request, Ceballos
agreed with the defense attorney that there were significant problems surrounding a state affidavit, problems that could adversely affect the prosecution of the
case.69 As a result, he forwarded a recommendation that the case be dropped.70
Ceballos’s recommendation was not well-received by his superiors, who not
only proceeded with the prosecution, but also stripped him of his position as

58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

Id.
Id.
Id. at 79.
Id.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 81.
Id.
Id.
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 410 (2006).
Id. at 413.
Id.
Id. at 413–14.
Id. at 414.
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calendar deputy, transferred him to another courthouse, and ultimately denied
him a promotion.71
Ceballos filed a suit in federal court, alleging that the actions were in retaliation for his exercise of his First Amendment speech rights.72 The Court disagreed, pointing out what it viewed as a critical difference between Ceballos’s
case and the others it had decided.73 When Ceballos forwarded his recommendation to his superiors, he was not speaking in his capacity as a private citizen
on a matter of public concern like Pickering. He was speaking as an employee,
but not on a matter of personal interest like Myers. Making such recommendations was officially part of his responsibilities as a calendar deputy. Therefore,
he was speaking in the course of doing his job.74
Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority: “We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does
not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”75 In the view of
the Court, Ceballos was not a victim of illegal retaliation over the exercise of
constitutionally protected speech. He was simply the recipient of consequences
for poor performance—in this case, making recommendations that his supervisors may have perceived as “inflammatory or misguided.”76
In sum, the trilogy of Pickering, Connick, and Garcetti provide the framework for all cases where public employees suffer ex post sanctions for engaging in expressive activity. Under Connick, employee speech on matters of private interest is left unprotected by the First Amendment. Under Garcetti,
speech that is pursuant to job duties is unprotected by the First Amendment.
Otherwise, employers must evaluate the disruptive impact or potential of employee speech under Pickering prior to imposing discipline.
B. The Public-School Student’s Speech Rights
A year after its seminal decision in Pickering, the Court once again turned
to the issue of First Amendment speech rights in public schools, this time in
the context of student speech. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District, the Court extended limited First Amendment speech rights to
students.77 Fifteen-year-old John Tinker and his thirteen-year-old sister Mary
Beth, along with sixteen-year-old Christopher Eckhardt, wore black armbands
to school as a symbolic protest to American involvement in Vietnam.78 The
students had planned to wear the armbands from December 16, 1965 through
71

Id. at 414–15.
Id. at 415.
73 Id. at 421.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 423.
77 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
78 Id. at 504.
72
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the holiday season but, when Mary Beth arrived at school on the sixteenth, she
was ordered to remove the armband.79 Though she complied with the administrator’s directive, she was still subsequently suspended.80 Eckhardt was also
suspended the same day.81 John Tinker wore his armband the next day and was
also suspended.82
The Court determined that the students’ First Amendment rights had been
violated, stating: “It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”83 While endorsing First Amendment protections for public school
students, the Court also affirmed that school officials have “comprehensive authority” to regulate student conduct within the schools.84 The problem, as the
Court explained, was how to reconcile students’ First Amendment rights with
the legitimate authority of the State to maintain order at school.85
In the Court’s view, balancing these competing interests requires an evaluation of the impact of particular speech upon the school environment. The students’ expression in Tinker was a “silent, passive expression of opinion. . . .”86
The armbands had not disrupted school business or interfered with the “rights
of other students to be secure and to be let alone.”87 The Court opined that,
when school authorities seek to sanction student expression, that decision must
be based on “something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”88 Instead,
school officials must show that the speech “materially disrupts classwork or
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. . . .”89
Seventeen years after Tinker, the Court would weigh in on another student
speech issue. In 1986, the Court decided Bethel v. Fraser, a case involving
Mathew Fraser, a high school senior who was punished for giving a nominating speech at a school assembly that referred to a candidate using “an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor.”90 Fraser’s speech contained no
explicit profanity, but was filled with crude sexual references and double entendre.91 Fraser shared the speech with two different teachers prior to the as79

Id.
See The City Club of Cleveland, Mary Beth Tinker 11.9.2018, YOUTUBE (Nov. 12,
2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fU8rZAiCk3w [https://perma.cc/S2FS-9TGH].
81 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 506.
84 Id. at 507.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 508.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 509.
89 Id. at 513.
90 Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 678 (1986).
91 Sample text of Fraser’s speech is as follows:
I know a man who is firm—he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his shirt, his character
is firm . . . Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary,
80
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sembly, both of whom advised him against delivering it and warned that there
could be “severe consequences” if he did.92 During the assembly, student reaction to the speech ranged from confusion to embarrassment.93 Some students
hooted, yelled, or mimicked the activities referenced in Fraser’s speech.94
The following day, school authorities suspended Fraser under a school rule
that prohibited “[c]onduct which materially and substantially interferes with
the educational process” such as “the use of obscene, profane language or gestures.”95 In addition to the suspension, Fraser was removed from a list of student candidates to speak at the graduation ceremony at the end of the school
year.96
Fraser challenged the school’s action in federal court, alleging that both
his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated.97 The district
court sided with Fraser, holding that the school rule was unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad; Fraser was awarded damages, including an injunction
against making him ineligible to speak at the graduation ceremony.98 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that, under Tinker,
the school had violated Fraser’s First Amendment speech rights by punishing
him for non-disruptive speech.99
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court found that Fraser’s speech differed significantly from the expression at issue in Tinker. An essential function
of public education in America, the Court stated, is to “inculcate the habits and
manners of civility as values in themselves . . . and as indispensable to the
practice of self-government in the community and the nation.”100 The Court
balanced the free speech rights of students against the state’s “countervailing
interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.”101 Fraser’s speech, while it may not have caused a substantial disruption,
constituted an intrusion upon a basic educational mission.102 Ultimately, the
Court concluded that it is not a violation of the First Amendment for a school
to discipline students for engaging in speech that is vulgar or offensive, even if

he’ll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn’t attack things in spurts—he
drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally—he succeeds.
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
92 Id. at 678.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
96 Id.
97 Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist., 755 F.2d 1356, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985).
98 Bethel, 478 U.S. at 679.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 681.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 685.
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not legally obscene.103 Further, school administrators have broad discretion to
define and determine what constitutes vulgar and offensive speech.104
The decision in Fraser did not overturn Tinker, it simply created an “exception” to it, a particular type of speech (lewd or vulgar) that is not protected
under the First Amendment. Two years after Fraser, the Supreme Court created a second exception to the Tinker substantial disruption standard when it decided yet another student speech case. Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, which was decided in 1988, involved a high school principal’s censorship of two articles that
were set to appear in the student newspaper at Hazelwood East High School in
St. Louis, Missouri.105 One of the articles was a feature about student experiences with pregnancy, and the other dealt with the impact of divorce on students.106 The principal worried that, though the article about pregnancy used
pseudonyms, the school community would still be able to identify the girls
who were profiled.107 With regard to the article about the impact of divorce,
the principal was concerned that one of the students featured had been highly
critical of her father, but student journalists had not given the father the chance
to share his side of the story.108
In determining that no First Amendment violation had occurred, the Court
made an important distinction between the facts of the case and Tinker. In
Tinker, the Court explained, it had answered the question of whether the First
Amendment required schools to “tolerate particular student speech.”109 In Hazelwood, however, the question was whether the First Amendment required
schools “affirmatively to promote particular student speech.”110 The difference
was significant because the question in Hazelwood required the Court to consider the authority of the state as educator to exert control over “schoolsponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities
that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to
bear the imprimatur of the school.”111 Thus, the Court crafted a distinct catego103

Id. at 685–86. Courts have never protected student speech or writing that is legally obscene. However, educators must remember that language is not legally obscene merely because it contains offensive, vulgar, or “dirty” words. To be legally obscene, material must
violate three tests developed by the Supreme Court: (1) it must appeal to the prurient or lustful interest; (2) it must describe sexual conduct in a way that is “patently offensive” to
community standards; and (3) “taken as a whole, [it] lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value.” Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
104 For more on Bethel, see David Schimmel, Lewd Language Not Protected: Bethel School
District v. Fraser, 33 EDUC. L. REP. 999, 999–1005 (1986); Elizabeth A. Shaver, Denying
Certiorari in Bell v. Itawamba County School Board: A Missed Opportunity to Clarify Students’ First Amendment Rights in the Digital Age, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1539, 1545–47
(2017).
105 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 264 (1988).
106 Id. at 263.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 270.
110 Id. at 270–71.
111 Id. at 271.
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ry of student speech that might be subject to discipline, specifically student
speech that is school-sponsored. The Court stated: “[E]ducators do not offend
the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over . . . student speech in
school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”112
The Court’s last student speech case was decided in 2007. In January of
2002, the Olympic Torch passed through Juneau, Alaska, on its way to Salt
Lake City, Utah, where the Winter Olympic Games were held that year.113 At
Douglas High School in Juneau, Principal Debra Morse allowed the students
and staff to exit the building in order to watch the Olympic Torch Parade as it
passed by the school.114 Joseph Frederick arrived at the school late that day and
joined a group of students who were standing across the street from the school
to witness the parade.115 As the Olympic Torch passed, Frederick and his
friends held up a large banner that read: “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”116 Principal
Morse approached the group and directed them to take down the banner.117
Everyone, with the exception of Frederick, complied.118 Frederick was suspended for ten school days pursuant to a school policy that forbade student expression that could be construed to advocate “the use of substances that are illegal to minors.”119
Frederick appealed to the superintendent of the district, who agreed that
the message on the banner seemed to advocate the use of marijuana and, as a
result, disrupted the school’s mission to educate students “about the dangers of
illegal drugs.”120 Frederick filed suit in federal district court, claiming a violation of his First Amendment rights.121 The district court granted summary
judgment for the district, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, ruling that the banner
was not sufficiently disruptive under Tinker to justify disciplinary action by the
school.122
The Supreme Court reversed. “Congress has declared that part of a
school’s job is educating students about the dangers of illegal drug use,” the
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Court declared.123 “Student speech celebrating illegal drug use at a school
event, in the presence of school administrators and teachers,” the Court continued, “poses a particular challenge for school officials working to protect those
entrusted to their care from the dangers of drug abuse.”124 Nothing in the First
Amendment, the Court reasoned, requires schools to tolerate student speech at
a school event that would heighten those dangers.125 Thus, another exception to
the Tinker substantial disruption test was created: schools may sanction student
speech that can reasonably be interpreted to promote illegal drug use, whether
or not that speech is disruptive.
Of all of the Supreme Court’s student speech cases, Morse is the only one
that even touched on the scope of school authority over student speech that
takes place off campus. The Court rejected an argument from the student that
his speech was not “school speech” simply because he physically had not been
on school grounds. The Court found that the student, who was “stand[ing] in
the midst of his fellow students, during school hours” was under the authority
of school officials at the time that the banner was unfurled.126 While the Court
did acknowledge an “outer boundar[y]” regarding the scope of school authority, it found that this outer boundary had not been reached on the facts of the
case.127
II. PUBLIC EDUCATOR SPEECH: EMERGING ISSUES AND TOPICS
Even before the explosion of social media and resultant litigation, lower
federal courts struggled to apply Supreme Court precedent to cases involving
public-employee speech. This has resulted in a significant split between the
circuit courts, which are divided on exactly how to discern when an employee
is speaking on a matter of private interest or as a citizen on a matter of public
concern. Most specifically, the disagreement revolves around which of the
Connick variables is most important: content, form, or context. This results in a
significant disparity in the breadth of public employee speech rights based upon the circuit.
Some circuits, including the Fourth, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh, have prioritized the form and context of speech. These “contextual circuits” place greater
weight “on both the capacity and the motivation of the speaker.”128 Public educators who live in contextual circuits may legally be subjected to adverse employment action even when their speech touches on a matter of inherent public
concern and is non-disruptive.129 Content-based circuits, which include the
First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth, largely eschew contextual fac123
124
125
126
127
128
129
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tors such as speaker capacity or motivation when the content of the speech
touches on an inherent public concern, such as politics or public corruption.130
Two cases, one from the Eleventh Circuit and one from the Sixth Circuit, illustrate how these two different approaches can impact outcomes.
In 1996, the Eleventh Circuit ruled against a public educator who criticized his school’s registration, scheduling, and teacher assignment processes.131 Social Studies teacher Lawrence Ferrara spoke out in a faculty meeting
and later in a private meeting with his principal.132 To his dismay, he was subsequently assigned to teach all freshman and sophomore courses.133 Though
the topics about which Ferrara had complained might have been inherently of
concern to members of the public, the court viewed his motivation for speaking
as purely personal.134 The court held that “a public employee may not transform a personal grievance into a matter of public concern by invoking a supposed popular interest in the way public institutions are run.”135 Because the
court viewed Ferrara as a disgruntled employee, his speech failed the Connick
test of public concern and was not protected.136
The Sixth Circuit reached a completely different conclusion in the case of
Netta Banks, a substitute teacher in Wolfe County, Kentucky who was reassigned after she had filed formal complaints with the state alleging irregularities in the interview and hiring process at her school.137 The complaints came
after a five-year period during which she repeatedly interviewed for full-time
teaching positions but was never offered a job as a certified teacher.138 Upon
reviewing the record, the Sixth Circuit found evidence in Banks’s testimony to
suggest personal motivation for her complaints—namely her personal grievance in having been passed over for employment.139 While the court acknowledged that Banks’s complaints were predominately private, the finding that
some of them touched on matters of public concern was enough to prompt the
court to remand the case to the district court so that Banks’s speech could receive a proper balancing under Pickering.140
Two additional circuit cases from outside the educational arena, both involving complaints about sexual harassment, provide an even more stark illustration of how this split results in a disparity in the breadth of speech rights for
educators and other public employees. The first, in 1994, involved an employee in the Department of Development of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania who
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
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complained that she had been sexually harassed by an executive assistant to the
county commissioner.141 Taking a content-based approach, the Third Circuit
focused directly upon the nature of the speech, which concerned an “incident
of sexual harassment” allegedly perpetrated by someone “exercising authority
in the name of a public official. . . .”142 Such discriminatory behavior on the
part of a public official was an issue that inherently rose to the level of public
concern, the court ruled.143 Though the complaint involved only the employee’s personal grievance related to sexual harassment, the court could find nothing in its analysis of the form and context of her complaints that would diminish the value of these communications “to the process of self-governance.”144
As such, the speech was protected, irrespective of contextual concerns such as
motivation or speaker capacity.
In contrast, two years later the Tenth Circuit held that a female officer’s
complaint of sexual harassment against male officers did not touch on a matter
of public concern and, therefore, was unprotected speech.145 Taking a contextual approach, the Tenth Circuit focused on the capacity in which the employee
spoke, even referring to it as the “fundamental inquiry” in its analysis.146 The
court evaluated the employee’s motivation to determine whether the speech
was “calculated to redress personal grievances [and therefore spoken as an employee] or to address a broader public purpose [and therefore spoken as a citizen].”147 Because the officer in question alleged that she had been “personally
subjected to sexual harassment, retaliation, and unwarranted disciplinary action” the court found that her speech dealt only with the “conditions of her own
employment,” indicating that she was speaking in the role of an employee, not
as a citizen.148 Her complaints of sexual harassment, therefore, were left unprotected.
Clearly, public employees who live in contextual circuits are far more at
risk of losing First Amendment protection in free speech cases. With the recent
explosion of litigation involving the online expression of public employees,
this split could become increasingly problematic. This is a major schism in circuit approaches that merits the attention of the Supreme Court. The way in
which the Court chooses to resolve this split will substantially alter the analysis
in public-employee speech cases over a large swath of the country. Despite the
existence of this interpretive split between circuits, analysis of cases involving
public employees and online speech does seem to reveal some larger trends,
which are discussed below.
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A. Connick is Rarely Decisive in Cases Involving Public Employees’ Online
Speech
After the launch of Facebook in 2004, as social media use became more
and more widespread among adults, it didn’t take long for problems to present
themselves for public educators. The earliest disputes involving educators and
social media found their way into federal district courts in 2008, and the educators lost both cases.149 The United States District Court of Connecticut upheld
the dismissal of a high school English teacher who communicated with students via MySpace during non-school hours.150 Jeffery Spanierman used his
page to discuss both school-related and personal matters with his students.151
The court used the Connick public concern test to strip Spanierman of his First
Amendment protection, noting that not much of the content on his page
seemed to rise to the level of a matter of public interest.152
Later that same year, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled against a student teacher at Conestoga Valley High
School who posted critical comments about her supervising teacher, as well as
a photo of herself hoisting a plastic cup and wearing a pirate hat.153 The photo
was accompanied by the caption “drunken pirate.”154 Stacy Snyder was in the
process of completing requirements for a bachelor’s degree and teaching credentials at Millersville University, but the picture, along with her criticism of
her supervising teacher, got her removed from her student teaching position.155
As a result, she was unable to complete her education degree or receive teaching credentials.156 Even though Snyder was a student and not an official employee of the district, a district judge applied the Connick test of public concern, and held that Snyder’s speech was that of an employee on a matter of
private interest, and was therefore not protected by the First Amendment.157
These two early cases fueled speculation that the Connick test of public
concern might, for all intents and purposes, strip First Amendment protection
from public educators who engage on social media. In 2010, Patricia Nidiffer
from the University of Dayton warned that any social media expression by a
public educator that does not touch on a matter of public concern is likely to be
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job-threatening if it finds the wrong audience.158 In 2012, Mary Rose Papandrea of the Boston College Law School also expressed concerns that judicial
reliance on Connick in social media cases would severely undermine the constitutional rights of public educators.159 These concerns seemed well-founded
in 2012, but as more and more cases have been decided, it appears that the
Connick public concern test is not as substantial a risk to educators’ online
speech rights as these scholars once thought.160
Of thirty-three federal cases reviewed since 2008, only nine (27 percent)
have relied on the Connick test of public concern to disqualify the online
speech of a public employee from First Amendment protection.161 The trend
toward bypassing Connick in favor of balancing under Pickering holds at both
the district and circuit court levels. Connick has proven decisive in only five of
eighteen (27 percent) district-level cases, with a nineteenth case featuring three
employees who passed Connick and one who did not. Employees failed to pass
the Connick test of public concern in four of fourteen (28 percent) of the circuit
level cases reviewed.162
This trend exists even in cases where employees engage in speech that arguably touches more on private than public concerns. The Ninth Circuit, in the
2009 case of Richerson v. Beckon, “assume[d], without deciding” that a teacher’s “highly personal and vituperative” blog posts about her employers and coworkers touched on matters of public concern.163 In 2013, the Seventh Circuit
held that a high school guidance counselor who had self-published a relationship book for women which was filled with misogynistic and racially offensive
language was speaking as a citizen on the dynamics of adult relationships, a
subject matter that it considered a public concern.164 In 2015, the Third Circuit
“reluctantly assume[d]” that a teacher was blogging on matters of public concern when she wrote about commentary she’d like to add to student’s report
cards, such as “[f]rightfully dim,” “[l]azy asshole,” and “[u]tterly loathsome in
all imaginable ways.”165 The court believed that she was, in her own way, addressing the work ethic of today’s youth and the value of hard work in general,
a matter of public concern.166
In 2016, the Fourth Circuit decided Liverman v. City of Petersburg, which
involved two police officers discussing police promotion policies on Face158
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book.167 One officer argued that promoting officers into leadership when they
had insufficient background or experience negatively impacted officer safety,
and the officer cited statistics to support his points.168 The second officer
agreed with the first officer’s points, but then made a thinly veiled reference to
an individual within the department whom he believed had been wrongly promoted.169 The district court analyzed the two officers’ speech separately and
found that the first officer’s speech passed the Connick test of public concern,
while the second officer’s didn’t.170 The Fourth Circuit, however, considered
the two officers’ speech as a “single expression of speech to be considered in
its entirety,” and held that both employees passed the test of public concern.171
While one officer had used a “more colloquial tone,” both were generally voicing concerns about the department’s ability to effectively carry out its mission.172
In 2017, the Fourth Circuit decided Grutzmacher v. Howard County, a
case with a similar set of facts. Members of a fire department were discussing
gun control online and making derogatory comments towards political liberals.173 Some of their online commentary was racially offensive.174 The court
opined that much, but not all, of the content discussed by the firemen touched
on matters of public concern.175 Again, the Fourth Circuit held that the multiple interactions and comments on Facebook should be treated as one single expression, one that focused on a matter of public concern.176
Decreased judicial reliance on Connick in favor of Pickering in First
Amendment cases involving public employees and social media or other electronic speech is not entirely surprising, considering that many social media users routinely use their accounts to discuss politics or other current events. As
such, it makes sense that the content of public-employee expression will also
frequently touch on matters of inherent public concern. In a significant number
of the cases reviewed, this was exactly the case. For example, in the 2013
Fourth Circuit decision Bland v. Roberts, the court held that deputy sheriffs
who had been fired after “liking” and making supportive comments on the Facebook page of the man running for sheriff were speaking as citizens on a matter of public concern—local politics.177 In Duke v. Hamil, a deputy police chief
in Georgia was demoted after posting a Confederate flag and a call for a sec-
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ond revolution in response to President Obama’s reelection.178 The political
nature of his postings ensured that his speech easily passed the Connick test of
public concern.179 Cases such as these serve to remind us that the content of
public employees’ social media expression is just like that of the public in general—often meant to be seen by a reasonably limited audience, but frequently
touching on matters of inherent public concern.
Even in cases in which employee speech does not seem on its face to be
inherently of public concern, judges have bypassed Connick. This was the case
in both Richerson and Munroe, where teachers blogged highly demeaning personal thoughts about co-workers and students.180 The Connick framework is
simply problematic in analyzing the type of speech presented in many of these
cases. Online speech often doesn’t fit neatly into the dichotomous categories of
either citizen speech on a matter of public concern or employee speech on a
matter of private interest. In many cases, an employee’s online speech represents a hybrid of the two types of speech identified in Connick—the speech of
a private citizen on a matter of personal interest.
A notable exception, however, is the Fifth Circuit—which has ruled
against public employees who were speaking as citizens on matters of private
interest three times between 2015 and 2018. The case Graziosi v. the City of
Greenville, Mississippi dealt with Sergeant Susan Graziosi of the Greenville,
Mississippi police department, who lost her job after posting comments on Facebook that were critical of the Greenville police chief.181 Graziosi was upset
that the chief had not sent a departmental representative to the nearby community of Pearl, Mississippi for the funeral of an officer from that department
who had been killed in the line of duty.182 Her initial post was on her personal
Facebook page and included a plea to the city’s mayor to “please get a leader”
who understood the importance of sending representatives to neighboring
communities when police officers are lost.183 Later, she reposted her comments
on the mayor’s public Facebook page, adding the rejoinder “[i]f you don’t
want to lead, can you just get the hell out of the way.”184 The district court had
ruled that she was speaking in the capacity of an employee, because she’d cited
her membership in the department and used the first person plural “we” to
show membership in that group.185 The Fifth Circuit disagreed, holding that
she was speaking not as an employee, but as a citizen.186 But while the Fifth
Circuit conceded that Graziosi’s speech held inherent public concern, it found
178
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that her posts “quickly devolved into a rant” against the chief’s leadership,
fueled by previous conflict between her and the chief.187 Thus, the Fifth Circuit
combined the Connick speech variables in a novel way to create a form of unprotected speech not previously contemplated by the Court in Connick: that of
a citizen on a matter of private concern.188
In the 2017 case Lumpkin v. Aransas County, the Fifth Circuit ruled
against two paralegals who were fired because of a series of private text messages in which they were critical of the Aransas County Attorney Richard
Bianchi.189 According to the court, the messages touched on the impact of
Bianchi’s campaign on the office, office and personal affairs, and opinions
about Bianchi’s intelligence and competence.190 The texts were between the
two paralegals and former Assistant Aransas County Attorney Deborah Bauer,
who had previously been fired by Bianchi.191 The messages only came to the
attention of the county because Bauer produced them as part of her legal challenge to her termination, which she also alleged was in retaliation for criticizing Bianchi.192 The Fifth Circuit held that the paralegals’ text messages were
clearly the expression of private citizens, but the expression still didn’t meet
the test of “public concern.”193 The court, therefore, disqualified the texts from
First Amendment protection, once again holding that when public employees
speak as private citizens on a matter of private interest, their speech is not protected.194
In the 2018 case Malin v. Orleans Parish Communication District, the
Fifth Circuit held for a third time that a public employee’s speech as a private
citizen on a matter of private concern is not protected.195 This case involved
Frith Malin, a deputy director of the Orleans Parish Communication District
(OPCD) who responded to an email from her supervisor, the executive director, announcing to the organization that one of OPCD‘s board members had
been named CEO of another organization and would be leaving the board.196
Malin emailed back, suggesting that this particular board member would do a
good job of “bleeding all these funds dry, just as he has done with the City.”197
Unfortunately, she hit the “reply all” button, sending her email to the entire organization. As a result, she was suspended and ultimately terminated.198 The
187
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Fifth Circuit ruled that the employee was speaking, at least in part, as a citizen,
but that the content of her email did not constitute a public concern.199
These recent decisions from the Fifth Circuit seem to increase the chances
of Supreme Court intervention at some point. And if other circuits follow the
Fifth Circuit’s lead and use Connick to strip First Amendment protection from
employees who are speaking as citizens on matters of private interest, Connick
could become a greater threat to educators’ online expression than it appears to
be currently. Until the Supreme Court clarifies where this type of speech fits
into the Connick equation, however, school administrators would be wise to
avoid taking negative employment action against educators because of online
speech, unless they have evidence to support some sort of disruptive impact on
institutional efficacy.200 Relying on a broad reading of the Connick test of public concern places employers at increased risk legally.
B. Online Employee Expression is Rarely Pursuant to Job Duties
In cases involving the online speech of public employees, the “pursuant to
job duties” test emanating from Garcetti v. Ceballos has rarely been determinative. There are only three cyber-speech cases in which a court has relied on
Garcetti in order to disqualify an employee from First Amendment protection.201 The most instructive of these was decided in October of 2014 by the
United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia. The
court ruled that Courtney Austin, the director of the Preston County Animal
Shelter, was speaking pursuant to her job duties when she created and administered a shelter Facebook page.202 “An employee may still be acting ‘pursuant
to official duties,’ ” the court stated, “even if she engages in speech that is not
part of her official job duties so long as it is in furtherance of such job duties.”203 Although Austin was not directed to establish and maintain the shelter
Facebook page, she did not use the page for personal communication, only for
shelter business.204 Austin’s posts showed as “Preston County Animal Shelter”
rather than her own name.205 The shelter’s Facebook page was listed in shelter
information as its official website.206 All this, in the view of the court, led to
the conclusion that she was speaking in the capacity of an employee “pursuant
to her job duties,” and as such, had no claim under the First Amendment.207
199
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The Preston County case would seem to suggest that educators who use
social media to communicate with students might be speaking “pursuant to job
duties.” But this stands in contrast to Spanierman v. Hughes, discussed supra,
which involved a high school English teacher who used the social networking
site MySpace to communicate with students.208 The district court considered
whether the online communications with students had occurred in his role “as a
public employee pursuant to his official duties.”209 Despite the fact that much
of the content on the page was school-related, the court did not view the online
communication as “pursuant” to his job duties, largely because there was no
evidence that he was directed by his employer to communicate with his students on MySpace.210
Spanierman notwithstanding, the Preston County case is cautionary for
any public educator who administers social media pages on behalf of a school
organization. A fine arts director, for example, who maintains a Twitter, Instagram, or Facebook page for a school program such as band, orchestra, or choir
should be aware that such communication could be considered pursuant to job
duties even if he or she was not specifically directed to maintain such a page.
Administrators who expect their employees to maintain an official web presence should ensure their employees know that their online expression is in furtherance of their job duties and is not protected speech.
Although the Preston County Animal Shelter case stands as the only federal case reviewed in which the social media expression of a public employee
was held to be pursuant to job duties, it should be mentioned that there are other forms of digital communication embraced in the modern workplace that may
be more susceptible to disqualification under Garcetti. Emails and texts are
much less likely to reach an unintended audience than social media postings
but can frequently go public as a result of litigation or open records requests.
When this happens, these forms of communication seem more likely than social media postings to be considered pursuant to job duties. Recently, the Tenth
Circuit ruled that a city planner was speaking pursuant to his job duties when
he sent an email to the city attorney raising concerns about suspected corruption directly related to a city project with which he was involved.211 Additionally, a federal district court in New York ruled that a teacher who sent a series
of internal emails expressing concerns about student discipline, conduct of district employees, district policies, lack of support, and alleged violations of
law/policy was speaking pursuant to her job duties.212 Cases such as these suggest that public educators should be exceedingly cautious about emails and
other text messages that pertain to work. Even when educators use private
emails or cell phones to communicate, if they are communicating with col208

Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 298 (D. Conn. 2008).
Id. at 309.
210 Id.
211 Knopf v. Williams, 884 F.3d 939, 949 (10th Cir. 2018).
212 Agyeman v. Roosevelt Union Free Sch. Dist., 254 F. Supp. 3d 524, 536–37 (E.D.N.Y.
2017).
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leagues or superiors about work-related issues, these communications may be
considered pursuant to job duties and therefore unprotected by the First
Amendment.
A trend that could make Garcetti more relevant in the future is the increasing embrace of social media by school systems interested in facilitating communication with stakeholders. Consider that when Frederick County Public
Schools in Maryland hired Katie Nash as their “Social Media Coordinator” in
November of 2016, they were looking to her to build more community engagement.213 “We had received feedback from some students in a focus group
that our tweeting was a bit flat,” Nash explained.214 In January of 2017, with
winter weather approaching, a student tweeted a request to the district:
“[C]lose school tammarow [sic] PLEASE.”215 From the district’s Twitter page,
Nash responded, “but then how would you learn to spell ‘tomorrow’?”216 Nash
was fired a week later.217
The district was widely criticized for its actions. Nash became a celebrity
on Twitter, but she didn’t challenge her firing.218 Even if she had, however, it’s
hard to see how her speech would not have qualified as “pursuant to job duties” under Garcetti, thus making it unprotected by the First Amendment. She
was, after all, the social media director for the district. Managing the district’s
social media presence was her job. As more school districts are considering
hiring social media managers in an effort increase their digital engagement, it
is possible that the Garcetti standard may come into play in more cases in the
future.
C. The Pickering Balancing Test is Frequently Decisive in Cases Involving
Public Employee Speech
Because Connick and Garcetti both seem to be of limited utility in cases
involving public employees and social media or other internet-based speech,
Pickering has emerged as the most relevant tool for analyzing online employee
speech. The concept of disruption articulated by Pickering is expansive enough
213

Tara Bahrampour, Maryland School District Worker Fired After Correcting Student’s
Spelling in Tweet, WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
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217 Id. This was despite Nash’s response receiving 1,400 likes and 1,100 retweets as well as
the student who posted the original misspelled tweet taking no offense. Id.
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https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2017/
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to allow employers broad leeway to discipline employees who engage in controversial speech online, as long as they can document some level of disruption
to the efficacy of the institution or individual employee. Pickering has proved
determinative in two-thirds (20/30) of the reviewed cases.219 In total, the Pickering test has tilted toward the employers in eleven of the cases in which it was
decisive, and toward the employees in nine.220 Until recently, it appeared that
the Pickering test was tilted significantly in favor of the employer. Through
2015, employees survived balancing under Pickering only twice.221 Only when
employers failed to present sufficient evidence of workplace disruptions did
employees prevail.222 In cases decided 2016 or later, however, there are seven
more examples of the test tilting towards employees.223
The Pickering Test in online speech cases often comes down to whether
the speech interferes with an employee’s ability to continue to function effectively in the workplace. For example, when Natalie Munroe blogged commentary that she wished to add to students’ report cards, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals held that, by directing such “invective” at the very people she was
supposed to serve, she had rendered herself unable to effectively continue in
the job.224 In Craig v. Rich Township High School District, the Seventh Circuit
upheld the firing of a high school guidance counselor and girls’ basketball
coach after he self-published a relationship book for women that was full of
misogynistic and racist stereotypes.225 Due to the nature of the book’s content,
members of the community rightfully lost confidence in the teacher’s fitness to
counsel or coach their children.
III. STUDENT OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH: CONFUSION AND DIVISION
Before the explosive growth of digital communications, several federal
circuit courts had affirmed that school officials have no authority over student
speech that takes place outside of school and does not disrupt the school environment.226 With the tremendous rise of digital communications—and the varying forms that such communications can take (text, tweet, Instagram photo,
219

See infra Appendix I and II.
Infra Appendix I and II.
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224 Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 458, 474, 476 (3d Cir. 2015).
225 See Craig v. Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist., 736 F.3d 1110, 1113–14, 1119 (7th Cir. 2013);
see also Duke v. Hamil, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1293, 1303 (N.D. Ga. 2014) (a deputy police
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and kept at home could not form basis for school discipline); Thomas v. Granville Cent.
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“liking” material on social media platforms)—the courts have struggled to find
the proper balance between students’ First Amendment rights when not at
school and the authority of school officials to discipline students for offcampus speech that affects the school environment. As a result, student-speech
cases decided by the lower federal courts in the last fifteen years or so have
brought about a confusing patchwork of varying standards and rulings on the
important question of whether school officials have authority to discipline students for speech that is created and distributed outside of school.
One of the early cases regarding student off-campus speech was a 2004
decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Porter v. Ascension Parish
School Board.227 In Porter, the Fifth Circuit held that a student’s violent drawing of a school shooting, which came to the attention of school officials two
years after its creation because the student’s younger brother had discovered
the picture at home and taken it to school, was not school speech that was subject to school authority.228
In determining that school officials had violated the student’s First
Amendment rights for disciplining him for a picture he had created and stored
outside of school, the Fifth Circuit noted that the student had not “publicized
[the drawing] in a way certain to result in its appearance at” school, thus removing it from the protection of the First Amendment.229 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit stated that “[p]rivate writings made and kept in one’s home enjoy the protection of the First Amendment . . . .”230 The court, while recognizing that the
distinction between “on-campus” and “off-campus” speech may sometimes be
unclear, posited that a student’s speech is subject to school authority only
where it has been composed on campus or “purposefully brought” to school.231
And when the Supreme Court decided Morse just a few years later, it cited the
Fifth Circuit’s decision in Porter for the proposition that an “outer boundar[y]”
exists, beyond which school officials may not regulate student speech.232
Very soon after the decisions in Porter and Morse, the issue regarding students’ First Amendment rights shifted dramatically from homemade banners
and hand-sketched drawings to electronically created speech. In the electronic
speech era, the federal courts have been unable to establish clear or consistent
standards to address the scope of school authority over students’ off-campus
speech. Rather, the federal courts have either declined to address the issue233 or
crafted various tests234 in an attempt to balance students’ speech rights with the
227
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232 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401 (2007).
233 Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 219 (3d Cir. 2011);
J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 933 (3d Cir. 2011).
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need for school officials to maintain a safe and orderly school environment.
While the courts have developed different analytical frameworks, the courts
largely do require that school officials satisfy some “threshold test” in order to
be able to assume authority over students’ off-campus electronic speech.235
And yet, with each successive decision of a federal appellate court, the scope
and requirements of these threshold tests have shifted greatly. Thus, the lower
federal courts—and school administrators—have little guidance when reviewing cases involving student off-campus, electronic speech.
A. Shifting Sands: The Federal Appellate Courts Create, Modify, and
Redefine the Scope of School Authority Over Students’ Off-Campus Speech
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals was the first federal appellate court
to weigh in on the issue of school authority over a student’s off-campus electronic speech.236 In two decisions that were issued within a year after the decision in Morse, the Second Circuit determined that school officials have the authority to discipline students for off-campus electronic speech if it is
“reasonably foreseeable that the [speech] would come to the attention of school
authorities”237 or otherwise “reach campus.”238
In both cases, the Second Circuit found the student’s manner of distributing the speech to be important in determining whether school officials could
assert authority over the off-campus speech. For example, in a case where a
student had created an instant message (IM) icon that depicted the shooting of
a teacher, the Second Circuit noted the “extensive distribution” of the icon, including both the number of individuals to whom the icon had been sent and the
amount of time that it remained available to be viewed.239 In the second case,
the Second Circuit noted that the student’s blog posting had been publicly accessible and that the student had “purposely designed” the blog posting to be
seen by the school community.240 Those actions by each of the two students
had made it “reasonably foreseeable” that the students’ speech would reach
school.241

alski v. Berkeley Cty Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011); Doninger v. Niehoff, 527
F.3d 41, 51–52 (2d Cir. 2008); Wisniewski ex rel. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34,
38–39 (2d Cir. 2007).
235 See Layshock, 650 F.3d at 219.
236 Doninger, 527 F.3d at 48; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 40.
237 Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39–40.
238 Doninger, 527 F.3d at 48; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 40.
239 Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39–40 (icon sent to 15 recipients and available for a three-week
period).
240 Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50.
241 Id.; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39.
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The Second Circuit’s reasonable foreseeability test was quickly adopted
and applied by both the Fourth and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeal.242 In a
case involving a student’s off-campus speech that had threatened a school
shooting, the Eighth Circuit relied on Second Circuit precedent in holding that
school officials had properly disciplined the student because it had been reasonably foreseeable that the student’s speech would “come to the attention of
the school authorities.”243 A year later, the Eighth Circuit again applied the
Second Circuit’s reasonable foreseeability test when it held that school officials could discipline students for off-campus racist speech because the speech
had been “reasonably [] expected to reach the school or impact the environment.”244
As the Second Circuit had done, the Eighth Circuit also noted the form of
distribution of the off-campus speech as relevant on the scope of authority issue. In one case, the student had communicated his thoughts about a school
shooting to several students via an instant messaging service.245 In the second
case, the students’ racist blog postings had appeared on a publicly accessible
website that was not password protected and, within only a few days after the
blog postings began, the majority of the student body had become aware of the
postings.246
The Fourth Circuit also has applied the Second Circuit’s “reasonable foreseeability” test, although the decision also contained language that has been
interpreted to have created a “nexus” test. In 2011, the Fourth Circuit decided
Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, a case filed by a high school student
who had created a discussion group webpage that bullied a classmate by alleging that the classmate had contracted herpes.247 In determining that school officials had properly disciplined the student for her off-campus speech, the Fourth
Circuit applied the Second Circuit’s reasonable foreseeability test.248 Specifically, the Fourth Circuit determined that discipline is appropriate when “it [is]
. . . foreseeable that the off-campus expression might . . . reach campus.”249 On
the facts of the case, the court determined that “it was foreseeable in this case
that [the student’s] conduct would reach the school . . . .”250 And, similar to the
Second Circuit cases discussed above, the Fourth Circuit noted that the student
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had encouraged widespread distribution of her speech, inviting approximately
100 people to join the discussion group webpage.251
The Kowalski decision also contained language that has been interpreted
as having created a “nexus” test to resolve the scope of authority issue.252 Specifically, the Fourth Circuit stated:
There is surely a limit to the scope of a high school’s interest in the order, safety, and well-being of its students when the speech at issue originates outside the
schoolhouse gate. But we need not fully define that limit here, as we are satisfied that the nexus of [the student’s] speech to [the] [h]igh [s]chool’s pedagogical interests was sufficiently strong to justify the action taken by school officials
in carrying out their role as the trustees of the student body’s well-being.253

The reference to a “nexus” in this passage caused some courts and commentators to opine that the Fourth Circuit had created a nexus test, although
the decision did not provide any details about the parameters of such a nexus
test.254 Although, it seems unlikely that the Fourth Circuit chose to create a
second test even as it applied the Second Circuit’s reasonable foreseeability
test,255 the decision continues to be cited as having created a nexus test.256 Indeed, as discussed in further detail below, later federal decisions have begun to
combine and conflate the reasonable foreseeability and nexus tests into one.257
In 2015, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, rather than adopting either the
reasonable foreseeability or the nexus tests, created its own threshold test regarding the scope-of-school-authority issue.258 The case involved a rap song
recorded outside of school and posted on the Internet that contained vulgar
language and accused two school employees of sexually harassing female students.259 In August 2015, an en banc panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dis251
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See, e.g., McNeil v. Sherwood Sch. Dist. 88J, 918 F.3d 700, 707 (9th Cir. 2019); Wynar
v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2013).
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255 Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 574.
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257 See supra Section III.A.
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trict court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the school board.260 While
declining “to adopt any rigid standard”261 with regard to the scope of authority
issue, the Fifth Circuit created a test that essentially only applied to the highly
specific facts before it. The majority held that school officials may discipline a
student for off-campus speech if (a) “a student intentionally directs [speech] at
the school community,” and (b) the speech is “reasonably understood by
school officials to threaten, harass, and intimidate a teacher.”262
The Third Circuit has avoided the scope of authority issue altogether, having decided two student off-campus electronic speech cases on other
grounds.263 The two cases both involved students who had been disciplined for
creating fake—and unflattering—social media profiles of school administrators. In the first case, the Third Circuit avoided the scope of authority issue because the school district alleged only that discipline was appropriate under
Fraser on the ground that the student’s speech had been lewd and obscene.264
School officials argued that, by using the district’s website to copy a photograph of the school administrator, the student had “entered” school, thus giving
school officials the authority to impose discipline.265 The Third Circuit rejected
that argument and held that Fraser applies only to lewd or obscene speech uttered at school, not to speech that appears on the Internet.266 In the second case,
the Third Circuit found in favor of the student on the ground that, even assuming that authority existed over the student’s off-campus speech, the school district had failed to satisfy Tinker’s substantial disruption test.267
The most recent decisions regarding the scope of school authority over
student off-campus speech have been issued by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.268 In 2013, the Ninth Circuit decided Wynar v. Douglas County School
District, a case in which a student had been disciplined for off-campus speech
that threatened a school shooting.269 The Ninth Circuit held that school officials had authority to discipline a student who, from his home, had sent “a
string of increasingly violent and threatening instant messages . . . bragging
about his weapons, threatening to shoot specific classmates, intimating that he
260
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would ‘take out’ other people at a school shooting on a specific date, and invoking the image of the Virginia Tech massacre.”270
In addressing the scope of authority issue, the Ninth Circuit reviewed all of
the then-issued decisions of its “sister circuits,”271 primarily the decisions of
the Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits.272 The Ninth Circuit noted that these
circuit courts had devised “additional threshold test[s]”273 as prerequisites to
the application of Tinker’s substantial disruption standard. The Ninth Circuit
identified both a nexus test, citing the Fourth Circuit,274 and a reasonable foreseeability test, citing the Second and Eighth Circuits.275
Yet the Ninth Circuit declined to adopt any of these tests. The court noted
the difficulty of articulating “a global standard for a myriad of circumstances
involving off-campus speech.”276 It also expressed “reluctan[ce] to . . . craft a
one-size fits all approach.”277 Rather, the court relied on the content of the student’s speech, stating that “when faced with an identifiable threat of school violence, schools may take disciplinary action in response to off-campus speech”
that would cause a substantial disruption.278
In 2016, the Ninth Circuit returned to the scope of authority issue. In C.R.
v. Eugene School District 4J, the Ninth Circuit held that school officials had
the authority to discipline middle school students who had directed sexually
suggestive speech to other students on property that was adjacent to school
grounds.279 The speech in question had taken place while the students were
walking home from school and, thus, was not electronic off-campus speech.280
As it had in Wynar, the Ninth Circuit found that there were two primary
tests to address the scope of authority issue: the nexus and reasonable foreseeability tests.281 The Ninth Circuit then confusingly endorsed not one of the tests
described above, but both of them, stating that it would “apply[] both the nexus
and reasonable foreseeability tests to [the student’s] speech.”282 In so doing,
the Ninth Circuit defined the nexus test as one that determines whether the student’s speech is “closely tied to the school.”283 The Ninth Circuit found that
the nexus test was satisfied because (a) all of the individuals involved had been
270
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students; (b) the speech had taken place just beyond school property; and (c)
the speech had taken place just after the school day ended such that the school
had an interest in student well-being as they were beginning their trips
home.284
The Ninth Circuit also determined that the reasonable foreseeability test
had been satisfied because “administrators could reasonably expect the harassment’s effects to spill over into the school environment” and “be disruptive
for affected students.”285 In that regard, the Ninth Circuit seems to have misapplied the Second Circuit’s “reasonable foreseeability” test. As a threshold test
to determine the scope of school authority over off-campus speech, the reasonable foreseeability test is designed to determine whether off-campus speech
would be discoverable by school officials, not whether the speech would be
disruptive to the school environment. The Ninth Circuit skipped that inquiry
altogether and proceeded directly to find that the off-campus speech was foreseeable to cause a disruption.
In its most recent decision, McNeil v. Sherwood School District, the Ninth
Circuit has muddied the waters even more.286 In McNeil, the court determined
that school officials had appropriately disciplined a student who had written a
“[H]it [L]ist” identifying students and school staff that the student determined
“Must Die.”287 The student had written the Hit List in a journal that he had kept
in his bedroom at home.288 About four months after the student wrote the Hit
List, his mother found the list in the student’s room and shared it with a therapist, who then determined that she was obligated as a mandatory reporter to
report the matter to the police.289 After the student was expelled from school,
he filed suit alleging a violation of his First Amendment rights.290
At the trial court level, the federal district court had determined that school
officials had authority to discipline the student for his off-campus speech under
both the nexus and reasonable foreseeability tests.291 In particular, the court
found that the nexus test applied to any student off-campus speech where the
content of the speech was related to school, even if the manner of communication—a private journal that was kept in the student’s room—might otherwise
indicate a lack of school authority.292 In that regard, the decision in McNeil
284
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seems directly at odds with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Porter, where the
court determined that school officials lacked the authority to discipline a student for a sketch that depicted violence at school. In issuing its decision, however, the trial court did not distinguish Porter on its facts, and only noted that
Porter was a Fifth Circuit case and that its reasoning had not been adopted by
the Ninth Circuit.293
Also of note in the McNeil trial court decision was the district court’s formulation of the nexus test. While the Ninth Circuit in C.R. had defined the
nexus test as an inquiry of whether the student’s speech was “tied closely
enough to the school to permit its regulation,”294 the federal district court in
McNeil used substantially more diluted language, stating that the nexus test
would not permit discipline for off-campus speech “not relating to the
school.”295
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision that discipline had not violated the student’s First Amendment rights.296 In its decision,
however, the Ninth Circuit created a new type of nexus test. The court stated:
“[C]ourts considering whether a school district may constitutionally regulate
off-campus speech must determine, based on the totality of the circumstances,
whether the speech bears a sufficient nexus to the school.”297 This new nexus
test, which is supposed to be “flexible and fact-specific,”298 should consider the
following factors: “(1) the degree and likelihood of harm to the school caused
or augured by the speech, (2) whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the
speech would reach and impact the school, and (3) the relation between the
content and context of the speech and the school.”299
The Ninth Circuit’s ruling in McNeil thus adds another layer of complexity
and confusion. In the Ninth Circuit, the reasonable foreseeability threshold test
has become but one consideration of a multi-factored nexus test for determining school authority over students’ off-campus speech.300 And the Ninth Circuit also chose to use vague language about the central inquiry of nexus, i.e.,
connection, between the speech and school. Rather than repeating the “closely
tied” language that it had used in C.R., the Ninth Circuit noted that nexus exists
merely if “the content of the speech involved the school.”301
Also of note is the court’s rejection of the student’s argument “that he had
no intent to communicate [his private writings] to anyone” and, indeed, had not
done so.302 In that regard, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in McNeil radically de293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302

Id. at *3 n.3.
C.R. ex rel. Rainville v. Eugene Sch. Dist., 835 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2016).
C.L.M., 2016 WL 894450 at *7.
C.L.M. ex rel. McNeil v. Sherwood Sch. Dist., 918 F.3d 700, 712 (9th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 707.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 710.
Id. at 708.
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viates from the prior precedent of all prior federal circuit court decisions,
where the student’s manner of distributing off-campus speech was highly relevant to the court’s ruling.303
It is quite clear that the Ninth Circuit was particularly concerned about the
fact that the student’s speech was a “credible, identifiable threat of school violence,”304 and with good reason. Indeed, the court properly recognized that,
when faced with such threats, school administrators are obligated to act in order to protect the school community.305 However, the Ninth Circuit’s broad
definition of “nexus” as any speech that involves school, together with a rejection of the argument that private speech is beyond school authority, raises the
thorny question of how this newly described nexus test is to be appropriately
applied in cases of non-violent student speech.306
For the lower federal courts, the lack of a consistent framework to address
the scope of school authority over students’ off-campus electronic speech has
been frustrating. One Pennsylvania federal district court noted the existence of
“discord” and “divi[sion]” within the courts regarding the question of how to
apply Tinker’s substantial disruption test to a student’s off-campus speech.307
In that case, one involving a student’s social media posting about a bomb at
school, the court stated, due to the unsettled state of the law, it would undertake to decide the case only “with considerable apprehension and anxiety.”308
This apprehension and anxiety is notable in judicial rulings involving different forms of students’ electronic expression, ranging from social media
posts on Facebook and Instagram to electronic expression that is stored on a
student’s cell phone. As discussed below, the courts have varied widely in their
approaches even in cases with very similar facts.
B. Discipline of Student Off-Campus Speech That Threatens Violence
Invariably is Deemed to be Constitutional
Although the federal circuit courts have adopted widely varying frameworks to address school administrators’ ability to review student online expression and impose discipline, there is one issue on which the courts nearly
303

S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 779 (8th Cir.
2012); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 571 (4th Cir. 2011); D.J.M. ex rel.
D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 765 (8th Cir. 2011); Doninger v.
Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Ed., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir.
2007).
304 C.L.M., 918 F.3d at 708.
305 Id. at 710.
306 Indeed, given that the Supreme Court has created specific, content-based exceptions to
students’ First Amendment rights, such as the prohibition on the use of lewd or obscene
speech at school, the courts simply should adopt a clear-cut rule that any credible threat of
school violence is subject to potential discipline whenever it comes to the attention of school
officials. See Shaver, supra note 104, at 1581–82.
307 R.L. v. Cent. York Sch. Dist., 183 F. Supp. 3d 625, 635 (M.D. Pa. 2016).
308 Id. at 630, 635.
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uniformly agree. Student speech—electronic or otherwise—that threatens violence to the school community will be subject to school authority and discipline.309 As discussed above, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in McNeil is perhaps
most emblematic of courts’ firm convictions that school officials always are
authorized to take action whenever they are made aware of a credible threat of
violence.
In any event, when the student’s speech involves a threat against the
school community, students almost uniformly fail to establish that a constitutional violation occurred.310 It does not matter if the speech is a picture on Instagram311 or other social media posting.312 It does not matter whether the court
applied the reasonable foreseeability test,313 nexus test,314 or just a “circumstance-specific inquiry.”315 The courts consistently will find that any student
speech that could reasonably be perceived as a threat to the school community
is subject to discipline of school officials.316
309

See, e.g., C.L.M., 918 F.3d at 710.
McKinney v. Huntsville Sch. Dist., 350 F. Supp. 3d 757, 763, 766 (W.D. Ark. 2018)
(student who posted a picture on Instagram of himself wearing a trench coat and holding an
AR-15 rifle was constitutionally subject to school discipline); A.N. ex rel. Niziolek v. Upper
Perkiomen Sch. Dist., 228 F. Supp. 3d 391, 394 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (student subject to school
discipline for an Instagram video posting of a school shooting, with a caption that read
“[s]ee you next year, if you’re still alive”); C.L.M. ex rel. McNeil v. Sherwood Sch. Dist.
88J, No. 3:15-cv-01098-SB, 2016 WL 8944450, at *9 (D. Or. Dec. 30, 2016); R.L., 183 F.
Supp. 3d at 639 (school authority existed over a student’s Facebook post that made reference to a bomb having been placed at school); N.Z. v. Madison Bd. of Educ., 94 N.E.3d
1198, 1201–02, 1212 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017) (students who had participated in social media
postings on a messaging app called “Kik” were subject to school discipline for having discussed the possibility of a school shooting (a “Klebold Surprise,” named after one of the
Columbine shooters, Dylan Klebold)).
311 McKinney, 350 F. Supp. 3d at 763.
312 R.L., 183 F. Supp. 3d at 639; N.Z., 94 N.E.3d at 1202.
313 McKinney, 350 F. Supp. 3d at 766–67; R.L., 183 F. Supp. 3d at 635, 639.
314 C.L.M., 2016 WL 8944450 at *7.
315 N.Z., 94 N.E.3d at 1212.
316 See J.R. ex rel. Redden v. Penns Manor Area Sch. Dist., 373 F. Supp. 3d 550, 559 (W.D.
Pa. 2019) (“[F]ederal courts have uniformly agreed that language reasonably perceived as
threatening school violence is not constitutionally protected—whether such language is
written or oral, and whether it occurs at school or elsewhere.”). The student speech should
constitute a credible threat to the school community. For example, in Burge v. Colton
School District, 100 F. Supp. 3d 1057, 1060 (D. Or. 2015), a middle school student established that his First Amendment rights had been violated after he was disciplined for offcampus statements he had posted on social media. The student complained that he wanted to
“start a petition to get [his teacher] fired,” id., that the teacher was “the worst teacher ever,”
id., and that she was “just a bitch.” Id. After a friend responded “XD HAHAHAHA!!,” id.
(“XD” is a laughing emoticon. See What Does XD Mean?, SLANGIT.COM,
http://slangit.com/meaning/xd [https://perma.cc/GAQ8-U95T] (last visited Oct. 5, 2019)),
the student wrote, “[y]a haha she needs to be shot.” Burge, 100 F. Supp. 3d at 1060. School
officials argued that the student’s speech constituted a “true threat.” Id. at 1068. The court
rejected that argument, noting that many facts indicated the lack of any belief that the
speech was threatening, particularly the fact that the student’s suspension was served at
school and no law enforcement had been called. Id. at 1064.
310
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C. The Courts Are Inconsistent in Their Approaches to Different Forms of
“Speech,” Particularly Photographs and Activity on Social Media
Platforms
Although the courts have taken a consistent approach in student-speech
cases involving potential threats to the school community, the courts struggle
to apply existing precedent to other types of student speech. In some cases, the
courts struggle with the scope of authority over a student’s off-campus speech.
In other cases, the courts struggle to apply speech precedents to new and different forms of speech.
For example, in Shen v. Albany Unified School District,317 a California
federal district court decided a case involving an Instagram account that contained racially divisive material. A high school student had created the Instagram account that featured posts “target[ing] fellow [] students and school personnel with racist and derogatory comments, often with a picture identifying
the target.”318 The pictures that were posted had been taken at school and, in
some cases, altered with the addition of curse words or other images, including
items like a noose.319 The student invited several friends to join the Instagram
account.320 These other students responded by either commenting on or liking
the posts made by the account’s creator.321 At least one student who had access
to the account neither commented on nor liked any of the posts during the time
that the account was active.322
Several months after the Instagram account was created, it came to the attention of African American students whose images appeared in the pictures.323
As news of the contents of the Instagram account spread throughout the high
school, students became increasingly agitated, and it was this agitation at
school that brought the existence of the Instagram account to the attention of
school officials.324 School officials ultimately decided to expel the student who
had created the account, while the other students were suspended for different
periods of time depending on their level of involvement.325 The students then
filed suit alleging a violation of their First Amendment rights.
The court first considered whether the students’ activity on the Instagram
account qualified as “speech” under the First Amendment. Citing Bland v.
Roberts, the court held that the acts of posting, commenting on, or even just
“liking” the material that had been posted on Instagram did constitute expres317

Shen v. Albany Unified Sch. Dist., No. 3:17-cv-02478-JD, 2017 WL 5890089 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 29, 2017).
318 Id. at *1–*2.
319 Id. at *6.
320 Id. at *1.
321 Id. at *2.
322 Id.
323 Id.
324 Id. at *3.
325 Id.
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sive activity.326 The court stated: “This action broadcasts the user’s expression
of agreement, approval, or enjoyment of the post, which is clearly speech protected by the First Amendment.”327
The court then concluded that school officials had authority to institute
discipline under either the reasonable foreseeability or nexus test.328 The nexus
test was satisfied because the pictures posted to Instagram had been taken at
school and were picture of specific African American students.329 The court
also found that the nature of the postings and the number of students with access to the account made it reasonably foreseeable that the students’ speech
would come to the attention of school authorities.330 Indeed, as to online
speech generally, the court stated: “[I]t is common knowledge that little, if
anything, posted online ever stays a secret for very long, even with the use of
privacy protections.”331
The court next addressed the question of whether discipline had been
properly imposed on the students under Tinker. As to the student who had created the account, taken the pictures at school, and authored the posts on the account, the court found that his speech had created a substantial disruption under Tinker.332 Thus, his First Amendment rights had not been violated by the
imposition of discipline.333
The court then divided the remaining student-plaintiffs into two groups:
one group consisted of those students who had commented on or liked posts
that targeted specific African American students, and the other group consisted
of students who commented on or liked posts that were racially divisive without identifying or targeting specific students.334 As to the first group of students, the court found that Tinker was satisfied because these students had
“meaningfully contributed to the disruptions at [school] by embracing [the]
posts . . . .”335 In addition, the court determined that the discipline of these students was constitutional under Tinker because the students’ speech had inter-

326

Id. at *5; see also M.L. ex rel. Longoria v. San Benito Consold. Indep. Sch. Dist., No.
1:17-cv-00160, 2018 WL 5629941 (S.D. Tex., Oct. 31, 2018) (adopting report and recommendation of magistrate judge, who found that high school cheerleader’s act of liking posts
on social media was a form of protected speech); M.L. ex rel. Longoria v. San Benito Consold. Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 1:17-cv-160, 2018 WL 6288142, at *1, *6–*7 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 31,
2018) (report and recommendation of magistrate judge).
327 Shen, 2017 WL 5890089 at *5. As to the one student who had neither commented nor
liked any of the posts, the court concluded that the student’s act of merely reading the material on the account constituted protected First Amendment activity. Id.
328 Id. at *6.
329 Id.
330 Id. at *7.
331 Id.
332 Id. at *8.
333 Id.
334 Id. at *9.
335 Id. at *9.
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fered with the rights of other students “to be secure and to be let alone.”336 By
commenting on or liking the Instagram posts that had identified and targeted
specific students, the court found that this first group of students had “impermissibly interfered” with the rights of other students to have a safe learning
environment.337
However, the court determined that the second group of students could not
be disciplined due to their acts of commenting on or liking the Instagram posts
that had not targeted specific students. The court distinguished the conduct of
these students on the ground that this third group of students had made comments or liked only a particular type of post, ones that did not, in the court’s
words, “target[] specific individuals at [the school],”338 stating:
Endorsement or encouragement of speech that is offensive or noxious at a general level differs from endorsement or encouragement of speech that specifically targets individual students. The former is much more akin to the “merely” offensive speech that is beyond the scope of Tinker. Although some of these
plaintiffs’ conduct may have been experienced as hurtful and unsettling by
classmates, the Court cannot say that their involvement affirmatively infringed
the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone.339

Finally, the court briefly concluded that these same students, by commenting on or liking racially divisive posts that did not specifically target other students, had not “contributed to” the disruptions that were present at school
based on the conduct of the other students who had posted, commented on, or
liked material on the Instagram account.340 Thus, they could not be disciplined
under Tinker.
The court’s ruling in Shen can be contrasted with an earlier decision of a
Tennessee federal district court, in which the court found that school officials
had no authority to discipline a student for a series of tweets posted on Twitter
that targeted a specific student.341 In Nixon v. Hardin County Board of Education, a middle school student was disciplined by school officials for having
posted on Twitter numerous comments about another student.342 The plaintiff’s
comments initially were in response to a posting from a friend, who was
threatening violence against a third student as part of a fight about a boyfriend.343 In one tweet, the plaintiff had stated, “[g]ood [l]uck. Shoot her in the
face.”344 In another tweet, the plaintiff had stated, “I hate her. That was my
whole point . . . . I’m funny. I’ll kill her.”345
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345

Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)).
Id. at *10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Nixon v. Hardin Cty. Bd. of Educ., 988 F. Supp. 2d 826, 830, 839 (W.D. Tenn. 2013).
Id. at 830–31.
Id. at 830.
Id.
Id.
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School officials disciplined the plaintiff by sending her to an alternative
school for a forty-five-day period, which later was reduced to ten days.346 She
then filed suit alleging a violation of her First Amendment rights. After reviewing the decisions of the Second, Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, the
court determined that the student’s First Amendment rights had been violated
because school officials had no authority over the off-campus speech.347 Specifically, the court rejected an argument that discipline was appropriate because the plaintiff had “used a social media platform to make negative and offensive comments about a classmate.”348 The court also stated that the
student’s speech lacked a sufficient “connection,” i.e., nexus, to school as
would allow school officials to assert authority over her off-campus speech.349
Indeed, the only connection to school was “the fact that both the speaker and
the target of the speech studied there.”350 The fact that the off-campus speech
involved a dispute between two students attending the same school alone was
not sufficient to vest school officials with authority to discipline the student for
her off-campus speech.
Some recent cases involving student speech involve social media posts,
but not ones that identify or are directed at other students. This set of cases involves students’ use of vulgar or sexually charged material on social media.
Again, the courts struggle to find a consistent approach. In A.F. v. Kings Park
Central School District,351 several students were given a one-day suspension
for having received a text message from another student that contained a video
of two minor students engaged in sexual activity. School administrators concluded that, among other violations of the school’s disciplinary code, all of the
students who had received the text message had violated the disciplinary code
by improperly possessing obscene material and engaging in “inappropriate use
of an electronic device.”352 Two students were suspended even though they
had immediately deleted the video after determining its contents; these two
students filed suit alleging, among other claims, a First Amendment retaliation
claim.353

346

Id. at 831.
Id. at 839.
348 Id.
349 Id.
350 Id.; see also J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094,
1109–10, 1122 (C.D. Ca. 2010) (holding that school had authority to consider imposing discipline on a student who posted a YouTube video that contained derogatory material about a
classmate under a reasonable foreseeability test; however, discipline was unconstitutional in
the absence of sufficient facts that the video either had caused an actual disruption at school
or that school officials could reasonably predict a future disruption).
351 A.F. ex rel. Fenton v. Kings Park Cent. Sch. Dist., 341 F. Supp. 3d 188, 193 (E.D.N.Y.
2018).
352 Id.
353 Id. at 193, 199–200.
347
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The court acknowledged that all of the activity related to the text message
had taken place outside of school,354 yet found that the students had no First
Amendment claim because the video could be classified as child pornography
that was not subject to First Amendment protection.355 Absent from the discussion, however, was the question whether school administrators had any authority to discipline students for being the recipients of a form of speech rather
than the speaker, or whether authority of school officials even extends to inappropriate social media use by students that occurs completely outside of
school.
That latter issue has been tested in a recent series of three cases that all involved cheerleaders.356 In each case, a high school cheerleader was dismissed
from the cheerleading squad for social media posts that primarily contained
obscene words. One cheerleader had posted an eight-second video on Snapchat
in which several cheerleaders were singing the lyrics of Big Sean’s song
“I.D.F.W.U.”357 Another cheerleader who was angry about not having been selected for the varsity squad posted, also on Snapchat, a picture of herself (out
of school on a Saturday in street clothes) with a middle finger raised and text
that read: “fuck school fuck softball fuck cheer fuck everything.”358 In the last
case, the cheerleader had made ten posts on Twitter that had some expletives
and sexual innuendo.359
In each of the three cases, school officials suspended the students from the
cheerleading squad for having violated policies about use of social media.360
Two of the federal district courts properly concluded that school officials had
no authority to discipline students for off-campus vulgar speech posted on a
social media account.361 In each case, the court rejected an argument that Fraser should be extended to permit discipline by school officials for lewd or obscene speech that occurs outside of school.362 Responding to the school’s argument that the speech had come onto campus by way of screenshots shown to
school officials by other students, the court stated: “[E]ven if the screenshots of
Plaintiff’s ten social media posts made their way to the school setting, online,

354

Id. at 193.
Id. at 200.
356 B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 376 F. Supp. 3d 429, 432 (M.D. Pa.
2019); M.L. ex rel. Longoria v. San Benito Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 1:17-cv-00160,
2018 WL 5629941, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2018); S.J. ex rel. Johnson v. Cache Cty. Sch.
Dist., 323 F. Supp. 3d 1301, 1308 (D. Utah 2018).
357 S.J., 323 F. Supp. 3d at 1309. “I.D.F.W.U.” stands for “I don’t fuck with you.” Id.
358 B.L., 376 F. Supp. 3d at 433.
359 Longoria, 2018 WL 5629941, at *1–2.
360 B.L., 376 F. Supp. 3d at 433; Longoria, 2018 WL 6288142, at *1; Johnson, 323 F. Supp.
3d at 1310.
361 B.L., 376 F. Supp. 3d at 432; Longoria, 2018 WL 5629941 at *4.
362 B.L., 376 F. Supp. 3d at 441–42 (holding that school has no educational mission to prohibit off-campus vulgarity); Longoria, 2018 WL 5629941 at *4.
355
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off-campus lewd speech ‘does not mutate into on-campus speech’ and remains
protected under the First Amendment.”363
The third case involved the eight-second video posted on Snapchat in
which cheerleaders were singing Big Sean’s song. In that case, on a motion for
a preliminary injunction to have the student reinstated to the cheerleading
squad, the federal district court found that the student had not demonstrated a
likelihood of success on the merits of her First Amendment claim.364 While
noting that the student’s discipline had been based on facts other than just the
mere language used in the video (namely “insubordination” under the disciplinary code and failing to take responsibility for her actions), the court stated the
following:
This case raises very interesting First Amendment issues for our social media
age. . . . Are there students across the country using profanity on social media?
Yes. Are some of those students cheerleaders? Yes. Do those cheerleaders have
the absolute right to remain on the cheer squad without consequences for such
posts when they are sent to other students at the school? This court cannot answer that question clearly and unequivocally yes, especially in the factual scenario in which S.J. made her post.365

Thus, unlike the other two decisions, the federal district court was unwilling to
find that the student’s posts to social media, which took place off-campus and
outside of school, were beyond the purview of school officials.366
Finally, the federal courts have struggled to apply school speech precedents in cases involving either photographs posted by students or even simply
stored on their cellphones. In a case out of the Northern District of Indiana, a
federal judge sided with two girls who were suspended from their extracurricular activities as a result of sexually suggestive photographs that they had
taken at a slumber party and posted on their social media accounts.367 The action against the girls was taken after another student’s parent had discovered
the photographs online and complained to the superintendent that the social
media postings were causing a rift on the volleyball team.368 At issue for the
judge was not only whether the conduct depicted in the photographs constituted expression for First Amendment purposes, but also whether the decisions to
take the pictures and then post them online were expressive acts protected by
the First Amendment. Each of these three decision points, the judge ruled,
were expressive acts that fell under the scope of First Amendment protection:
I conclude that whether the punishment of T.V. and M.K. was based on the acts
depicted in the photographs, the taking or existence of the images themselves,
363

Longoria, 2018 WL 5629941 at *4 (quoting J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d
915, 940 (3d Cir. 2011) (Smith, J., concurring)).
364 Johnson, 323 F. Supp. 3d at 1322.
365 Id. at 1321.
366 Id. at 1322.
367 T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 772, 784 (N.D.
Ind. 2011).
368 Id. at 772.
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or the posting of the photographs to the internet, each of those possibilities qualifies as “speech” within the meaning of the First Amendment.369

The court also concluded that the discipline of the plaintiffs for their offcampus social media postings violated the First Amendment.370
In another case, a Pennsylvania federal court considered whether school officials violated the student’s First Amendment rights by reviewing her text messages and photographs after her phone was confiscated pursuant to the school’s
cellphone use policy.371 In N.N. v. Tunkhannock Area School District, the student filed suit alleging that her First and Fourth Amendment rights had been
violated by school officials who disciplined her based on semi-nude and nude
photographs that she had taken of herself and sent to a boyfriend.372 The photographs had been discovered by the school principal who, upon receiving the
confiscated phone from a teacher, proceeded to review the stored photographs
on the phone.373 The court noted the following relevant facts: “The photographs were taken off school property, were saved to the cell phone, were never emailed or uploaded to the internet, and were not shared with other students.
To access the photographs, which are not immediately visible, school officials
must have ‘clicked’ on at least three ‘menu’ selections.”374 The student’s
phone was turned over to law enforcement officials, who threatened to, but ultimately never did, charge the student with a felony.375 Rather, the school and
law enforcement officials required the student to complete a sexual violence
and victimization course.376 Thereafter, the student filed suit against the school
district and others alleging a violation of her First and Fourth Amendment
rights.377
The school district settled with the student shortly after it was filed, but the
case proceeded against individual and municipal defendants, who filed motions

369

Id. at 777.
Id. at 785.
371 N.N. v. Tunkhannock Area Sch. Dist., 801 F. Supp. 2d 312, 313 (M.D. Pa. 2011). The
conduct of school officials spawned numerous related lawsuits. See, e.g., Miller v. Mitchell,
598 F.3d 139, 143 (3d Cir. 2010); Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 637 (M.D. Pa.
2009).
372 N.N., 801 F. Supp. 2d at 314–15. The case was filed by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) on the student’s behalf. See ACLU Settles Student-Cell-Phone-Search Lawsuit
with Northeast Pennsylvania School District, AM. CIV. LIB. UNION (Sept. 15, 2010), https://
www.aclu.org/news/aclu-settles-student-cell-phone-search-lawsuit-northeast-pennsylvaniaschool-district [https://perma.cc/D9RX-QUZP]. The ACLU has been active in litigating the
issue of searches of students’ cellphones, litigation that has resulted in the adoption by some
school districts of policies that limit the scope of any such searches. See Amy Vorenberg,
Indecent Exposure: Do Warrantless Searches of a Student’s Cell Phone Violate the Fourth
Amendment?, 17 BERKLEY J. CRIM. L. 62, 86 (2012).
373 N.N., 801 F. Supp. 2d at 314.
374 Id.
375 Id. at 315.
376 Id.
377 Id.
370
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to dismiss all claims.378 The court denied motions for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged a violation of her First
and Fourth Amendment rights.379 Thereafter, the remaining defendants also
settled with the plaintiff, a settlement that included a monetary payment to the
plaintiff.380 Because of the settlement, the court did not render a final decision
on the merits of the student’s First Amendment claim.
A Mississippi federal district court reached the opposite conclusion in a
case that also was filed by a student who had been disciplined at school after
school officials reviewed photographs stored on his cellphone.381 In J.W. v.
DeSoto County School District, the cellphone of a seventh-grader was confiscated because he brought it to school and used it in violation of school policy.382 The teacher who confiscated the cellphone searched the photographs
stored on the phone and discovered photographs—taken by the student at home
in his bathroom—that school officials deemed to be evidence of use of “gang”
symbols.383 The student contended that the photographs were nothing more
than childish dancing and posing in the bathroom mirror.384
The student filed suit alleging a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights
only; he did not assert any violation of his First Amendment rights.385 The
court granted motions to dismiss filed by individual defendants and one municipal defendant, although the school district itself remained a defendant in the
case.386 In considering the extent of the student’s privacy rights under the
Fourth Amendment, the court in J.W. stated, without citation to any authority,
that “[the] student’s decision to violate school rules by bringing contraband on
campus [i.e., the cellphone] . . . appropriately results in a diminished privacy

378

Id. (noting that the case was filed on May 10, 2010); see also AM. CIV. LIB. UNION, supra note 375 (announcing settlement in September 2010).
379 N.N., 801 F. Supp. 2d at 315.
380 Stipulated Order of Dismissal at 5, N.N. v. Tunkhannock Area Sch. Dist., 801 F. Supp.
2d 312 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (No. 3:10-CV-01080) (indicating a $10,000 payment directly to
plaintiff and an additional $10,000 payment to the ACLU).
381 J.W. v. Desoto Cty. Sch. Dist., No. 2:09-cv-00155-MPM-DAS, 2010 WL 4394059, at
*1 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 1, 2010).
382 Id.
383 Id.
384 See id.
385 Id. at *3. The Fourth Amendment inquiry regarding searches of a student’s person or
belongings by school officials is examined under a two-part test established by the Supreme
Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985). First, the search must be justified
at its inception, which essentially requires that school officials have reasonable grounds to
believe that the student violated the rules of the school. Id. at 341–42. Second, the scope of
the search must be reasonably related to the grounds for instituting the search in the first
place. Id. at 341. Searches may not be excessive in terms of the nature of the infraction. Id.
at 342.
386 J.W., 2010 WL 4394059, at *9. As to the municipal defendant, the court found that the
plaintiff had not alleged that city employees had undertaken any search of the phone; rather,
it was the school district employees who had searched the phone. Id. at *3. Thus, no Fourth
Amendment claim could be asserted against the municipal defendant.
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expectation in that contraband.”387 The court also minimized the extent of
school officials’ review of the cellphone’s contents, characterizing their decision “to merely look at the photos on [the student’s] cell phone” as a limited
intrusion into the student’s privacy.388
Nonetheless, the court’s opinion was not wholly in favor of the school district’s actions. In dicta, the court noted that it had “serious concerns regarding
the school district’s actions in this case.”389 In particular, the court expressed
concern that the district had taken disciplinary action against the student not
based on the minor offense of bringing his cellphone to school, but based on
school officials’ interpretation of the meaning of photographs taken by the student in the privacy of his home and stored on the phone.390 In that regard, the
court stated:
Public actors step upon a very slippery slope when students are expelled on this
basis, particularly if the school district’s opinions in this regard are based largely upon subjective impressions of a student’s private activities off school
grounds. The slope is even slippier [sic] when, as here, the school district only
obtained the evidence of these activities by conducting a search which, while
not unconstitutional, does tread into a constitutionally sensitive area. 391

Indeed, the court concluded by suggesting that the school district settle the
case, stating that the district should “recognize that there are limits . . . upon
the power of school officials to police the private lives of their students.”392
And, in fact, the district did settle the case.393
Given the court’s apparent concern that discipline was imposed due to a
student’s private, unpublished, and off-campus activities, it is possible that the
court would have reached a different conclusion had the plaintiff asserted a violation of his First Amendment right to engage in off-campus speech that is
beyond the reach of school officials’ authority. In any event, the case highlights the difficulty of applying school speech precedents to cases involving
photographs taken by students while not at school that, due to being stored on a
mobile device that is carried to school, come to the attention of school authorities.

387

Id. at *5.
Id. (emphasis added). The court granted motions to dismiss filed by school district employees on qualified immunity grounds. Id. at *7.
389 Id. at *9.
390 Id. at *6 (expressing “serious concerns regarding the wisdom and legality of the school
district’s decision to expel [the student] based on its subjective impressions of photographs
depicting him in his personal life.”).
391 Id. at *9.
392 Id. at *9 n.5.
393 See Order Dismissing Action by Reason of Settlement, J.W. v. Desoto Cty. Sch. Dist.,
No. 2:09-cv-00155-MPM-DAS, 2010 WL 4394059 (N.D. Miss. Nov 1, 2010) (No.
2:09CV155-M).
388

46

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL[Vol. 20:Error! Reference source not found.
IV. THEMES AND IMPLICATIONS

Parts II and III of this article have highlighted the developing law around
the electronic speech of both educators and students. While the analysis of employee speech is significantly different than the analysis of student speech,
some larger themes do emerge in both educator and student speech cases. This
Part explores some of those themes and their applications to student and educator speech, respectively.
A. Scope of Authority
The ubiquitous nature of social media has brought into focus the question
of the school’s scope of authority to regulate speech that students and teachers
create and distribute outside of school. In this area, there is a significant difference between students and employees. There is no question that Pickering allows the state, as an employer, the authority to discipline public educators for
expressive conduct, regardless of where the speech occurs. Marvin Pickering
composed his letter outside of school and, had it disrupted the school, he may
have legally faced job-related discipline. Even prior to the Internet and social
media, the location of the employee speaker has never been the focus of the
courts. Instead, the primary considerations are the nature of the content and the
capacity within which the employee was speaking.
By contrast, most of the student-speech cases in the digital age focus heavily on the in-school versus out-of-school nature of the student’s speech and
whether school officials have authority to discipline students for speech created and distributed outside of school.394 Focus on this issue has led to the proliferation of “threshold” tests to address the scope of authority issue and, in recent cases, a “kitchen sink” approach where a court will adopt all varieties of
threshold tests and apply them to the facts.395 The current approach lacks a
firm analytical foundation and inevitably leads to confusion on the part of public school administrators about their ability to discipline students for offcampus speech. Thus, public-school administrators considering disciplinary
action against students for online, off-campus speech should be aware of the
law within their own federal circuit. Other than speech involving a credible
threat of violence to the school community, there is little guidance for school
administrators regarding the scope of their authority to act.

394

See, e.g., C.R. ex rel. Rainville v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir.
2016) (framing the legal issue as one involving scope of authority over students’ off-campus
speech); R.L. v. Cent. York Sch. Dist., 183 F. Supp. 3d 625, 636 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (“The
main quandary of federal courts is whether Tinker applies to student speech that occurs offcampus at all . . . .”).
395 See C.R., 835 F.3d at 1150 (holding that both a nexus and a reasonable foreseeability
test can be applied); N.Z. v. Madison Bd. of Educ., 94 N.E.3d 1198, 1212 (Ohio Ct. App.
2017) (applying fact-specific inquiry, nexus test, and reasonable foreseeability test).
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B. The Concept of Disruption Differs between Educators and Students
Whether student or educator speech is at issue, the concept of disruption is
a critical consideration. For educator speech, the Court has explicitly and expansively defined disruption. In Pickering, there is granular guidance as to
when employee speech might be disruptive enough to merit discipline. Under
Pickering, public employers may legally take action against an employee when
evidence exists that the employee’s expression interfered with school operations, impeded the employee’s ability to perform his job duties, or constituted a
willful or reckless false statement.396 Further, under Pickering, speech that
breaches confidentiality or undermines superior/subordinate relationships can
subject an employee to workplace discipline.397 The Court even allowed that,
in some cases, a public educator might engage in expression “so without foundation as to call into question his fitness to perform his duties in the classroom.”398
These guidelines for evaluating the disruptive impact of employee speech
do not change based upon whether the speech occurs on or off campus. Rather,
the concept of disruption in the realm of educator speech appears to have no
in-school/out-of-school boundary. More important is the underlying notion that
a public educator should demonstrate a basic level of mental and moral fitness
to serve as a teacher, caretaker, role model, or disciplinarian. Thus, the Third
Circuit concluded that Natalie Munroe’s blog postings about commentary that
she wished to add to students’ report cards was disruptive under Pickering because, by directing such invective towards her students, she had become unable
to effectively do her job.399 The Seventh Circuit similarly found that a high
school guidance counselor/girls’ basketball coach who self-published a relationship book for women that was full of misogynistic and racist stereotypes
was legally fired under Pickering because the community justifiably lost confidence in his fitness to effectively coach or counsel their children.400
In addition, public employees lose constitutional protection when they
speak as an employee on a matter of private concern or pursuant to their job
duties, and in such a situation, they may be legally disciplined irrespective of
whether the speech was disruptive. Nonetheless, it is always the most prudent
course for school administrators to evaluate the disruptive impact of the speech
on a case-by-case basis before making any negative employment decision. In
cases involving online speech, the Connick and Garcetti threshold tests have
not been frequently used by courts to disqualify employee speech—and in the
396

Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572–73 (1968).
Id. at 570 n.3.
398 Id. at 573 n.5.
399 Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 473–74 (3d Cir. 2015).
400 See Craig v. Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist., 736 F.3d 1110, 1113–14, 1120–21 (7th Cir.
2013); see also Duke v. Hamil, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1293–34 (N.D. Ga. 2014) (a deputy
police chief was demoted after posting an image of a confederate flag with the caption “time
for the second revolution” the morning after President Obama’s reelection).
397
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cases where employees have prevailed on free speech claims, it has generally
been the result of the employer failing to document disruption.401
The concept of disruption in the student-speech realm, by contrast, has developed quite differently. In Tinker, the Court held that student speech that
creates a material or substantial disruption or invasion of the rights of others
may be disciplined by the school, but it did not give a great deal of guidance
about exactly what would constitute such a disruption.402 Over time, the courts
have determined that a substantial disruption occurs in a variety of contexts,
including when teachers may be “incapable of teaching or controlling their
classes” because of the student’s speech,403 when the “educational responsibilities” of school administrators are interrupted to respond to a student’s
speech,404 or even when a student’s speech leads to a breakdown of a “civil and
respectful atmosphere” that is part of an orderly school day.405
However, in the context of off-campus speech, the courts have struggled
with the contours of actual or forecasted disruptions within the school environment.406 The result is a compilation of rulings that, in many cases, are highly inconsistent with one another. One such example is the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Bell, where the court found that school officials could have forecasted
that the student’s rap song would lead to a future disruption.407 Engaging in rather hyperbolic language, the Fifth Circuit found that a future substantial disruption exists whenever a student’s off-campus speech disparages a teacher (or
coach) because the speech would interfere with the educational process and,
without education, there would be “little, if any, civilization.”408
The Bell decision stands in contrast to the Third Circuit’s decisions in two
cases that involved discipline of two students who created disparaging fake social media profiles of school principals.409 Under both sets of facts, the ability
of a school official to be effective at school arguably had been impacted, but
the courts differed greatly in their treatment of the off-campus speech. While

401

See Wudtke v. Bieber, No. 16-C-260, 2017 WL 2274475 (E.D. Wis. May 24, 2017); see
also Mattingly v. Milligan, No. 4:11CV00215 JLH, 2011 WL 5184283 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 1,
2011).
402 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
403 Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001).
404 Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 51–52 (2d Cir. 2008).
405 Requa v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1280 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
406 See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 399 (5th Cir. 2015); Kowalski v.
Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain
Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 930 (3d Cir. 2011); Nixon v. Hardin Cty. Bd. of Educ., 988 F.
Supp. 2d 826, 836 (W.D. Tenn. 2013).
407 Bell, 799 F.3d at 400.
408 Id. at 399–400. This position was roundly criticized in the dissenting opinion of Judge
Dennis, who characterized the majority’s position as converting the Tinker disruption inquiry into a “toothless” standard. Id.
409 J.S., 650 F.3d at 930–31; Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d
205, 216 (3d Cir. 2011).
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the Fifth Circuit predicted that student off-campus speech that disparages410 a
teacher or coach might lead to the end of civilization, the Third Circuit simply
found that, in the absence of a disruption at school, students’ off-campus
speech, even speech that mocks or disparages a school official, is not subject to
discipline.411
Another example is the Ninth Circuit’s decision in C.R., where the court
conflated the issue of whether off-campus speech was reasonably foreseeable
to come to the attention of school officials with the issue of a reasonable forecast of future disruption. The court held that the reasonable foreseeability test
was satisfied because school officials could have seen that the off-campus
speech would “spill over” into the school environment.412 Indeed, the Ninth
Circuit posited that merely seeing one of the “harassers” in the school hallway
could be “disruptive” to a student.413
Other courts have taken a “hands-off” approach, as in the Nixon case,
where the court found that text messages by one student that arguably threatened another student were not subject to school discipline because they had
been exchanged outside of school and did not cause any disruption.414 A California federal court similarly determined that school officials had not been able
to demonstrate the existence of disruption resulting from a YouTube video in
which several high school students made derogatory and disparaging remarks
about another student.415 In finding that school officials had failed to demonstrate either an actual or forecasted disruption, the court noted that school discipline cannot be imposed because one student is embarrassed, has hurt feelings, or otherwise may not want to attend class.416 The court also declined to

410

It is true that the Fifth Circuit characterized the student’s rap song as threatening, harassing, or intimidating speech, not merely disparaging speech. However, in a dissenting opinion, Judge Dennis criticized the use of such “content-based” and “vague” terms that were
wholly opinion based. Bell, 799 F.3d at 412–13. On the facts of the case, it is highly questionable whether the coaches referenced in the student’s rap song felt that they had been
threatened, harassed, or intimidated. See Shaver, supra note 104, at 1588 (discussing particular facts that demonstrated the lack of any reasonable belief that the student had threatened,
harassed, or intimidated the coaches).
411 J.S., 650 F.3d at 931.
412 C.R. ex rel. Rainville v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142, 1151 (9th Cir. 2016).
413 Id. The Ninth Circuit did find that the students’ speech was subject to discipline under
Tinker’s “rights of others” prong, although the court’s analysis under that prong is questionable as well. The court found that the rights of the students who had been subject to the sexually charged speech were impinged upon because school officials had questioned those
students about the speech, causing them to feel uncomfortable. Id. at 1152. The court also
found that “[t]he school could . . . reasonably expect that those [uncomfortable] feelings
would cause [the student] to feel less secure in school.” Id. In other words, it was the questioning of school officials that created the uncomfortable feelings that might have—in the
future—caused the student to feel less secure.
414 Nixon v. Hardin Cty. Bd. of Educ., 988 F. Supp. 2d 826, 839 (W.D. Tenn. 2013).
415 See J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1122
(C.D. Cal. 2010).
416 Id. at 1117, 1121.
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defer to school officials, who claimed the need to impose discipline in order to
protect the “emotional well-being of its young students.”417
Thus, while both Pickering and Tinker relied heavily on the concept of disruption to or interference with the work of school, the application of those concepts to off-campus electronic speech differs greatly between educators and
students. While public educators are never able to shed the mantle of “teacher”
and enjoy truly unencumbered free speech rights, in the case of student speech,
the issue is much less clear. In the context of student speech, school administrators will have to carefully consider the facts of any particular case and proceed with the understanding that they have no good guidelines to follow.
C. Employee and Student First Amendment Rights May Differ Based on the
Content of the Speech
Generally, the rights of children are more limited in scope than those of
adults.418 This, however, doesn’t hold true for online, off-campus speech—
where the scope of authority of the state to regulate off-campus employee
speech is more clearly established than the scope of authority of the state to
regulate off-campus student speech. Further, the notion of mental or moral
“fitness” is one that only applies in the employment context. As a result, students may have stronger First Amendment rights with regard to certain topics,
namely lewd or sexually suggestive speech and racially divisive speech.
Fraser established that students may be disciplined for speech that is lewd
or vulgar when that speech occurs at school or a school function, but not when
that speech occurs online and off-campus.419 Thus, students ought to be able to
engage in lewd and sexually suggestive speech in online, off-campus forums,
so long as the speech does not target a specific student.420 Although certain recent decisions might undercut the clear distinction between on-campus and offcampus lewd speech,421 generally, students maintain the right to use foul language or sexual innuendo in their off-campus communications.
Employees, on the other hand, may well be subject to job-related discipline when they post material that is lewd; such speech is very likely to undermine the employee’s fitness or effectiveness, thus becoming disruptive to
institutional efficacy under Pickering. For example, the “hypersexualized” na417

Id. at 1121–22.
See James G. Dwyer, Equality Between Adults and Children: Its Meaning, Implication,
and Opposition, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1007, 1011 (2013).
419 See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986); see also Klein v. Smith, 635
F. Supp. 1440, 1441 (D. Me. 1986) (student’s vulgar gesture to teacher off campus was not
subject to school authority).
420 See, e.g., T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 776,
783–84 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (holding that school had no authority to discipline high school girls
who posted photographs online that showed students using toy props in the form of sexual
organs).
421 S.J. ex rel. Johnson v. Cache Cty. Sch. Dist., 323 F. Supp. 3d 1301, 1320–21 (D. Utah
2018).
418
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ture of Bryan Craig’s book in the Rich Township School District case “loomed
large” in the Seventh Circuit’s finding that his speech was disruptive to his
ability to effectively function as a school guidance counselor.422 While lewd,
vulgar, or sexually explicit speech is dangerous for public educators, it may be
less so for other public employees. Although a federal district court in Indiana
upheld the dismissal of a Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA) volunteer
in 2018 after she self-published a book detailing her experiences as a phonesex worker and linked it to her Facebook page, the Seventh Circuit subsequently reversed the lower court’s decision, finding no evidence that the book had
resulted in any workplace disruption.423
With racially insensitive speech, the legal calculus also may be different
depending upon whether the speaker is a student or employee. Courts are almost certain to uphold negative employment consequences for public employees who engage in such expression, regardless of whether the speech is directed toward individuals in the school community, or if it is simply a general
expression of a racist world view. For example, in Snipes v. Volusia County,
the Eleventh Circuit upheld disciplinary action taken by the county against one
of its beach patrol officers, who had posted racially insensitive comments and
sent racially insensitive texts in the aftermath of the Trayvon Martin killing in
2012.424 In Geer v. Altiere, a federal district court in Ohio upheld disciplinary
action against a deputy sheriff in Trumbull County after the sheriff disparaged
Freddie Gray, an African American who died in the custody of Baltimore Police, allegedly as a result of excessive force.425 And in Duke v. Hamil, a deputy
chief’s posting of the Confederate flag in response to President Obama’s
reelection was enough to justify his demotion.426
But when students are away from school, their First Amendment rights
seem to clearly encompass an ability to express themselves in a racially insensitive manner. Unlike public employees, there is no concept of “fitness” that
would allow school administrators to take action against students for simply
expressing racist opinions outside of school. As noted in Shen, school authorities can only discipline students for this type of speech when it qualifies as materially disruptive under Tinker.427 While racist student speech may be upsetting to many within the school environment, it isn’t likely to trigger the level of
disruption required under Tinker unless the speakers threaten or otherwise target individuals or groups of students. The Instagram account created by the
422

Craig v. Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist., 736 F.3d 1110, 1119 (7th Cir. 2013).
Harnishfeger v. United States, No. 1:16-cv-03035-TWP-DLP, 2018 WL 1532691, at
*1–*2 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 29, 2018), aff’d in part rev’d in part No. 18-1865, 2019 WL 6486869
(7th Cir. Dec. 3, 2019).
424 Snipes v. Volusia Cty., 704 F. App’x. 848, 850, 853–55 (11th Cir. 2017).
425 Geer v. Altiere, No. 4:16CV2213, 2018 WL 1535232, at *5–*6 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 29,
2018).
426 Duke v. Hamil, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1293, 1303 (N.D. Ga. 2014).
427 Shen v. Albany Unified Sch. Dist., No. 3:17-cv-02478-JD, 2017 WL 5890089, at *11
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2017).
423
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students in Shen featuring altered photographs of minority students with profane language and violent images is an example of the type of student speech
that targets and disrupts the school community in a way that would make it actionable by the school. Merely expressing a noxious racist point of view is not
enough.428
D. The Courts Take an Expansive View of Speech for First Amendment
Purposes
The nature of social media has forced the courts to explore not only the
words that are written, but other means of online expression, such as “liking”
certain posts or pages, sharing other persons’ posts, or posting pictures online.
The question some courts have considered is whether the person who “likes”
something is more akin to an audience member who claps when another is
speaking—think of Mr. Fraser’s speech—or an actual speaker.429 Whether the
case involves student speech or educator speech, the courts have developed a
fairly expansive view of what constitutes “speech” for First Amendment jurisprudence.
In Bland v. Roberts, the Fourth Circuit dealt squarely with whether “liking” content on social media constituted an expressive act for First Amendment purposes.430 The court explained that, once a person understands what it
means to “like” content on social media, “it becomes apparent that his conduct
qualifies as speech.”431 “In the context of a political campaign’s Facebook
page,” the court opined, “the meaning that the user approves of the candidacy
whose page is being liked is unmistakable.”432 In Shen, the court cited Bland in
the context of student speech, specifically addressing the question whether students who liked content on Instagram could be subject to discipline.433 While
the Fourth Circuit has determined that “liking” content on Facebook is an expressive act, no court has yet weighed in on the act of “retweeting” content on
Twitter. Whether or not a Twitter user who “retweets” content created by another Twitter user is necessarily endorsing that expression is a point of disagreement among Twitter users, but it might be prudent for school administra428

Id. at *2, *10.
See, e.g., Alicia D. Sklan, @socialmedia: Speech with a Click of a Button? #SocialSharingButtons, 32 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTER. L.J. 377, 389 (2013) (arguing that
“[l]iking a Facebook page [] is core speech”).
430 Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 384–85 (4th Cir. 2013). In Bland, when the case was
appealed to the Fourth Circuit, Facebook filed an amicus curiae brief arguing that Facebook’s “like” feature was a form of communication that merited First Amendment protection. Brief for Facebook, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 2, Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368 (2013) (No. 12-1671); see also Ira P. Robbins, What is the Meaning of
“Like”?: The First Amendment Implications of Social Media Expression, 7 FED. CTS. L.
REV. 127, 144 (2013); Jorge R. Roig, Emerging Technologies and Dwindling Speech, 16 U.
PENN. J. CONST. LAW 1235, 1235–36, 1236 n.7 (2013).
431 Bland, 730 F.3d at 386.
432 Id.
433 Shen, 2017 WL 5890089, at *5–*6.
429

Fall 2019]

THE FIRST AMENDMENT

53

tors to assume that the voluntary nature of the act would render it speech under
the First Amendment.434
It is common for one individual to create content on social media, to which
other individuals will react, either by commenting, liking, or posting memes or
pictures. The difficult issue is not whether such activity is a form of expressive
activity. The difficult issue is the degree of responsibility of each individual. In
terms of weighing the legality of disciplinary action against students or employees who participate in these types of social media interactions, the courts
have struggled to be able to distinguish levels of culpability among the speakers. Indeed, the courts have applied different methods of analysis for students
as opposed to employees. In Liverman, the Fourth Circuit treated the social
media postings and comments of various public employees as a single expression of speech, whereas in Shen, the court treated the various comments and
likes posted by students as separate expressions.435
Treating the speech as separate expressions allows the court to support differentiated consequences for different speakers, based upon their specific expressive conduct, as was the case in Shen. However, in the case of student
speech, it might require a court to engage in a somewhat tortured analysis of
the level of disruption caused by a student’s single act of liking the post of another person. In the case of employee speech, treating an online discussion as
one single expression for the purposes of the Connick analysis will mean that
each individual who posted, commented, or liked will be treated the same. In
Liverman, this approach turned out to be speech protective, where the elevated
nature of one of the officer’s comments had the effect of pulling the second officer’s comments under the umbrella of protected citizen speech.436 Clearly,
however, that may not always be the outcome. Thus, in the realm of speech
that involves an individual’s act of merely “liking” someone else’s speech, the
analysis could be thorny.
That same difficulty also is present with expressive activity that consists of
sharing pictures and videos online. Such activity is common practice for both
students and adults, and often these images may memorialize conduct or otherwise convey messages that are troubling to school administrators. A practical
implication for school administrators is that they must take a broad view of
what constitutes “expressive” conduct. If an image conveys a message that offends or upsets school administrators, that, in and of itself, is a pretty strong
indication that the conduct is “inherently expressive.”437 Before taking action
434

See Frank E. Langan, Likes and Retweets Can’t Save Your Job: Public Employee Privacy, Free Speech, and Social Media, 15 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 228, 244 (2018) (arguing that
public employees can better protect their job interests by assuming that retweeting will be
considered an expressive act).
435 Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400, 410 (4th Cir. 2016); Shen, 2017 WL
5890089, at *10.
436 Liverman, 844 F.3d at 410.
437 T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 776 (N.D. Ind.
2011).
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against conduct that is memorized in online photographs, administrators would
be wise to consider whether the behavior is expressive in nature and, if so,
whether there is a disruptive impact.
E. Can Educators and Students Claim Their Speech is Political Hyperbole?
When a public educator posts content online that might cast serious doubt
upon his/her judgment, or provides evidence of prejudice against particular
groups of students, employers and judges are forced to make evaluative judgments as to whether the speech is so egregious that it serves as evidence of an
educator’s lack of fitness to continue his or her duties. Just what sort of expression would disqualify one to continue as an educator is a calculus that is highly
influenced by contemporary community values. In cases up until now, when
public employees have engaged in expression online that disparages individuals or groups of students, it has generally been fatal to their free speech claims.
But in 2019, the public seems to be increasingly divided regarding the question
of how to distinguish between a lack of fitness and harmless hyperbole, particularly when it comes to social media.438
There has been a coarsening of our public and political discourse, particularly online. One of the nation’s highest profile users of social media, President
Donald Trump, has pushed the boundaries of what the public does or does not
view as appropriate online expression from a public figure. In April of 2018,
Trump used his Twitter account to respond to Stephanie Clifford (a.k.a.
Stormy Daniels), who had released a sketch of a man she claimed had threatened her in order to keep her from publicly discussing her alleged affair with
Trump.439 “A sketch years later about a nonexistent man,” tweeted the president, “[a] total con job, playing the Fake News Media for Fools (but they know
it)!”440 Believing that the President had publicly called her a liar, Daniels filed
a civil case for defamation, which was dismissed in October of 2018. The
judge agreed with the President’s argument that the tweet, even though it was
“derogatory and disparaging,” was protected speech: “[T]he tweet in question
constitutes ‘rhetorical hyperbole’ normally associated with politics and public
discourse in the United States. The First Amendment protects this type of rhetorical statement.”441
Even before the President relied upon this strategy to successfully get the
Clifford defamation case dismissed, his Twitter feed had inspired another attorney to consider a “political hyperbole” defense for his high-profile client.
438

The Supreme Court in Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) used the phrase
“political hyperbole” in holding that an individual could not be criminally prosecuted for
having stated, in a discussion of police brutality and the Vietnam War draft: “If they ever
make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.” The Court found that
those words constituted political hyperbole and not a true threat against President Lyndon
Johnson. Id. at 706, 708.
439 Clifford v. Trump, 339 F. Supp. 3d 915, 919 (C.D. Cal. 2018).
440 Id.
441 Id. at 925.
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Disgraced pharmaceutical executive Martin Shkreli was free on a five-milliondollar bail while awaiting sentencing after his conviction on three counts of
fraud in August of 2017.442 In September of 2017, he posted an offer on Facebook of a $5,000 payment in exchange to anyone who could “grab a hair” off
of Hillary Clinton’s head as she embarked on a book tour.443 A federal district
judge in Brooklyn stated the post “could be perceived as a true threat” and revoked Shkreli’s bail, sending him directly to jail.444 Shkreli’s attorney’s Benjamin Brafman publicly argued that Shkreli’s tweet was simply a form of the
same type of “political hyperbole” that President Trump engaged in throughout
the 2016 campaign, citing specifically a Trump tweet attacking Hillary Clinton
in which he referenced “Second Amendment people” as the only way to stop
her if she were to be elected.445
In March of 2018, Florida middle school teacher Dayana Volitich was removed from her social studies classroom after her employers discovered that
she had been hosting a “white nationalist podcast.”446 Through her lawyer,
Volitich publicly stated that, in her podcast, which she did under a pseudonym,
she was merely attempting to employ “political satire and exaggeration, mainly
to the end of attracting listeners and followers, and generating conversation
about the content discussed . . . .”447 Volitich never got to test this defense in
court, however, because when an investigation showed that she had been deceiving school administrators about what she’d been teaching in her classroom,
she submitted her resignation.448 Although it hasn’t happened yet, it is reasonable to speculate that an increasing number of public educators (and other public employees) may attempt to defend their speech by claiming that it is political or social hyperbole and therefore protected speech.
As discussed supra, student-speech cases do not turn on a question of
mental or moral fitness as cases involving employees often do. Therefore, students may be less likely to raise a “political hyperbole” defense. Students
442

Stephanie Clifford, Martin Shkreli is Jailed for Seeking a Hair from Hillary Clinton,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/business/dealbook/
martin-shkreli-jail.html [https://perma.cc/7X47-8A2H].
443 Id.
444 Id.
445 Renae Merle, Martin Shkreli Jailed After Facebook Post About Hillary Clinton, WASH.
POST (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2017/09/13/
martin-shkreli-apologizes-for-facebook-post-about-hillary-clinton/?utm_term=.8691a3f20
fa6 [https://perma.cc/NE2N-T925].
446 Phil McCausland & Erik Ortiz, Florida School Removes Teacher Who Hosted White
Nationalist Podcast, N.B.C. NEWS (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/
florida-school-removes-teacher-who-hosted-white-nationalist-podcast-n853096
[https://perma.cc/TZ2R-J5RF].
447 Id.
448 Carly Zervis, Volitich Investigation Found Cause for Discipline: Teacher Disputes
Findings, but Resignation Renders Null Any Punishment, CITRUS COUNTY CHRON. (May 2,
2018), https://www.chronicleonline.com/news/education/volitich-investigation-found-causefor-discipline/article_c57e3f14-4e49-11e8-98bc-c7bff01a02cd.html.
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sometimes seek to characterize their speech as attempts to be funny or sarcastic
but, in the context of threatening speech, the courts have invariably rejected
such attempts.449 Students also have not succeeded in claiming that off-campus
speech that meets a definition of bullying was really nothing more than a
joke.450
The success of a “hyperbole” defense for student speech that is neither
threatening nor bullying is less clear. The Third Circuit’s decision in J.S.
demonstrates that such a defense sometimes can succeed. In J.S., the court
ruled in favor of a student who created a hyperbolic and profane parody profile
of his principal on MySpace, explaining that the speech was so outrageous that
no reasonable reader would take it seriously.451 And it is clear that students’
right to engage in comedic expression, even if it is deemed “juvenile and silly,”
is protected under the First Amendment.452
CONCLUSION
In the years since Pickering and Tinker were decided, our communicative
technology has outpaced our First Amendment jurisprudence. The advent of
the Internet and social media have created significant free speech challenges
inside the public schools. As internet-based speech controversies have wound
their way up the court system, some clarity has been gained about how the Supreme Court precedent is applied to online speech controversies in the publicschool setting. But educational practitioners continue to struggle to make decisions related to personnel or student discipline that are consistently defensible
in both the legal and ethical sense. As the title of this article suggests, significant unanswered questions remain.
As far as employee speech, the most significant unanswered questions
concern the application of Connick to online speech. First and foremost is
whether and how the Supreme Court will settle the split between the circuits
regarding content versus context. Second, and more generally, will courts continue to bypass the public concern test in Connick in favor of balancing online
speech of employees under Pickering? Will the Garcetti “pursuant to duty”
threshold test gain more relevance in future cases? And will our coarsening political discourse eventually allow employees to successfully defend their controversial online speech as “political hyperbole”?
In terms of student speech, of course the most pressing unanswered question involves the scope of school district authority to sanction students for their
449

See, e.g., J.R. ex rel. Redden v. Penns Manor Area Sch. Dist., 373 F. Supp. 3d 550, 564
(W.D. Pa. 2019) (collecting cases); R.L. ex rel. Lordan v. Cent. York Sch. Dist., 183 F.
Supp. 3d 625, 639, 647 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (rejecting the student’s contention that he was joking); Yates v. Cobb Cty. Sch. Dist., No. 1:15-cv-3211-SCJ, 2016 WL 9444376, at *3, *13
(N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2016).
450 See, e.g., Dunkley v. Bd. of Educ., 216 F. Supp. 3d 485, 492 (D.N.J. 2016).
451 J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 920, 929 (3d Cir. 2011).
452 T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 775 (N.D. Ind.
2011).
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off-campus expressions. Although almost all circuits that have heard such cases have decided that the Tinker disruption standard can be applied to offcampus student speech, there are significant discrepancies from circuit to circuit regarding when and how. This uncertainty may continue unless and until
the Supreme Court weighs in.
Amid this uncertainty, an overarching best practice recommendation for
school administrators dealing with online speech controversies involving either
students or employees is to always engage in a thorough and thoughtful evaluation of the disruptive impact of that speech, remembering that one’s own
subjective reaction to the speech is not relevant. For employees, the definition
of “disruptive” is spelled out by the Pickering Balancing Questions, which are
easily applied to off-campus, online speech. For students, the analysis is less
clear. Whether it’s students using social media to threaten or harass teachers or
classmates, or educators sharing racist diatribes that prompt members of the
community to question their fitness to teach, the problems generated for the
public administrator are substantial.
Ethical administrators aspire to protect the rights of both students and employees but must respond to student or employee speech in a way that protects
safety, order, discipline, and achievement within the school. The principles
outlined in this article will hopefully help both legal and educational practitioners meet this challenge.
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APPENDIX I: COURT OF APPEALS CASES INVOLVING PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AND
CYBER SPEECH
CASE

SPEECH

PURSUANT TO

PUBLIC

PICKERING BALANCE

JOB DUTIES?

CONCERN?

TEST

Bland v. Roberts,

Deputy sheriffs “liked” and

730 F. 3d. 368 (4th

made supportive comments

No

Yes

Passed: no showing of
disruption within sher-

Cir. 2013).

on Facebook page of boss’s

iff’s office.

political opponent.
Craig v. Rich Twp.

High school guidance coun-

High Sch. Dist.,

selor and girls’ coach self-

No

Yes

Failed: speech that
objectified females

736 F.3d 1110 (7th

publishes sexually explicit

would justifiably erode

Cir. 2013).

self-help book for women.

confidence and trust in

Graziosi v. City of

Veteran police officer criti-

Greenville, 775

cizes chief’s decision to not

failed if speech had

F.3d 731 (5th Cir.

send representative to of-

been deemed on public

2015).

ficer funeral in neighboring

concern, due to disrup-

city.

tion of working rela-

employee as counselor.
No

No

N/A, but would have

tionships.

CASE

SPEECH

PURSUANT TO

PUBLIC

PICKERING BALANCE

JOB DUTIES?

CONCERN?

TEST

Grutzmacher v.

Paramedic comments on

Howard Cty., 851

Facebook disparaging gun

No

Yes

Failed: comment could
cause dissent, discord,

F.3d 332 (4th Cir.

control and liberals. After

appearance of racial

2017).

being directed to remove

bias, erode public trust,

comment, he complained

encourage disrespect,

about the social media poli-

and insubordination.

cy.

Department had already repealed portions
of social media policy
that were overbroad or
vague, so that was
moot.

Harnishfeger v.
United States, No.
18-1865, 2019 WL
6486869 (7th Cir.
Dec. 3, 2019).

VISTA volunteer writes
book about previous experience as phone-sex worker
and posted announcement
and Amazon link on her
Facebook page.

No

Yes

Passed
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Experienced city planner

884 F.3d 939 (10th

non-renewed by mayor

Cir. 2018).

after expressing le-
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Yes

N/A

N/A

Failed

gal/ethical concerns regarding a project with which he
had some involvement in an
email to city attorney.
LeFande v. District

Police officer fired for mak-

No – Court

Yes – Court

of Columbia, 841

ing harsh and accusatory

need not ad-

doesn’t spe-

F.3d 485 (D.C. Cir.

statements in emails to

dress question,

cifically

2016).

superiors.

because it will

address, but

fail Pickering

moves to
Pickering

Liverman v. City

Two police officers engage

No

of Petersburg, 844

in Facebook exchange ex-

Yes

Passed: and social media policy was consid-

F.3d 400 (4th Cir.

pressing disapproval of

ered overly broad.*

2016).

promotion procedures.
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CASE

SPEECH

PURSUANT TO

PUBLIC

PICKERING

JOB DUTIES?

CONCERN?

BALANCE TEST

Lumpkin v. Aransas

Paralegals were fired after

Cty., 712 F. App’x 350

private text messages with

No

No – even
though it

(5th Cir. 2017).

assistant county attorney

was clearly

were critical of bosses’

citizen

failure to resign while run-

speech

N/A

ning for higher offices.
Texts were captured in
lawsuit between assistant
county attorney and county
attorney.
Malin v. Orleans Par.

Deputy Director of Orleans

Commc’ns Dist., 718

Parish Communication

F. App’x 264 (5th Cir.

District accidently hits “re-

2018).

ply all” and sends email

No

No

N/A

No

Yes

Failed: invective

criticizing one of the board
of directors.
Munroe v. Cent. Bucks

Teacher blogged disparag-

Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d

ing comments about stu-

directed at students

454 (3d Cir. 2015).

dents

undermined teach-

Odermatt v. N.Y.C.

NYCTF (New York City

Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.

Teaching Fellow) writes

App’x 842 (2d Cir.

critical comments in

2017).

NYCTF Facebook groups

er effectiveness.

about “Relay,” the master’s
program NYCTF had
placed her with. After
warnings, fellow writes
email to NYCTF pushing
back and was subsequently
removed from the program.

No

No

N/A
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PURSUANT TO

PUBLIC

PICKERING

JOB DUTIES?

CONCERN?

BALANCING TEST?

Richerson v. Beck-

Curriculum specialist blogs

Assumed

Failed: undermined

on, 337 F. App’x

insulting remarks about su-

No

yes, but not

workplace relation-

637 (9th Cir.

pervisors and colleagues.

decided.

ships and personal

2009).

effectiveness.

Snipes v. Volusia

Beach patrol supervisor fired

No

Cty., 704 F. App’x

for racially insensitive Face-

sumed by

848 (11th Cir.

book posts and text messages

district

2017).

(texts while on duty) in af-

court, not

termath of Trayvon Martin

discussed on

killing.
Utter v. Colclazier,

Substitute teacher suffers

714 F. App’x 872

retaliation for Facebook sup-

(10th Cir. 2017).

port of bond election.

Yes – as-

Failed

appeal.
No

*Denotes employer’s social media policy ruled overbroad and vague.

Yes

Passed
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APPENDIX II: FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT CASES DEALING WITH PUBLIC
EMPLOYEE CYBERSPEECH
CASE

SPEECH

Agyeman v. Roosevelt

Teacher sent series of

Union Free Sch. Dist.,

internal emails express-

254 F. Supp. 3d 524

ing concerns about

(E.D.N.Y. 2017).

student discipline, con-

PURSUANT TO

PUBLIC

PICKERING

JOB DUTIES?

CONCERN?

BALANCING TEST?

Yes

N/A

N/A

Yes

N/A

N/A

No

Yes

Passed

No

Yes

Passed

No

duct of district employees, district policies,
lack of resources/support, and
alleged violations of
law/policy.
Austin v. Preston Cty.

County animal shelter

Comm’n, No.

director puts objection-

1:13CV135, 2014 WL

able posts on animal

5148581 (N.D. W. Va.

shelter Facebook page,

Oct. 14, 2014).

refuses to give password to bosses.

Bailey v. Barrett, No. 17-

Public defender posts

0937-CV-W-BP, 2018

derogatory comments

WL 2051513 (W.D. Mo.

about supervisor on

May 2, 2018).

Facebook.

Bryant v. Vill. of Bald

Police officer fired for

Head Island, No. 7:14-

series of texts with co-

CV-223-H, 2017 WL

workers in which he

1194347 (E.D.N.C. Mar.

discussed newspaper

30, 2018).

article written by supervisor.

Cannon v. Vill. of Bald

Four police plaintiffs

Yes for three

Passed: for 3 plain-

Head Island, No. 7:15-

fired for series of pri-

employees, no

tiffs who passed

CV-187-H, 2017 WL

vate group text mes-

for Cannon.

public concern test.

2712958 (E.D.N.C. June

sages in which they

All were

N/A for Cannon

22, 2017).

were discussing news-

speaking as

paper article written by

citizens, but

supervisor as well as

Cannon was

making jokes about co-

speaking on a

workers.

matter of private interest.

Fall 2019]

CASE

THE FIRST AMENDMENT

SPEECH

63

PURSUANT

PUBLIC

PICKERING BALANCING

TO JOB

CONCERN?

TEST?

DUTIES?
Cochran v. City of

Employee publishes book

Atlanta, 289 F. Supp.

criticizing homosexuality

No

Yes

Failed

No

Yes

Failed: comment impeded

3d 1276 (N.D. Ga.
2017).
Czaplinski v. Bd. of

School security guard posts

Educ., No. 15-2045

about “black thugs” in-

ability to do daily du-

(JEI/JS), 2015 WL

volved in shooting of Phil-

ties/cast doubt upon her

1399021 (D.N.J.

adelphia police officer.

judgment and fairness.

Mar. 26, 2015).
Duke v. Hamil, 997

Deputy Police Chief posts

F. Supp. 2d 1291

rebel flag and calls for sec-

No

Yes

Failed: speech communicated racist ideology,

(N.D. Ga. 2014).

ond revolution the morning

which undermines public

after Obama’s re-election.

trust and confidence in
law enforcement.

Geer v. Altiere, No.

Police officer in Baltimore

4:16CV2213, 2018

posts negative post regard-

WL 1535232 (N.D.

ing Freddie Grey in the

Ohio Mar. 29, 2018).

aftermath of his death at the

No

Yes

Failed

No

Yes

Passed: employer showed

hands of Baltimore PD.
Mattingly v. Milli-

Public employee makes

gan, No.

sympathetic remark on

4:11CV00215 JLH,

Facebook regarding fired

2011 WL 5184283

co-workers.

no evidence of disruption.

(E.D. Ark. Nov. 1,
2011).
Moreau v. St. Landry

Fire Department Chief crit-

Par. Fire Dist. No. 3,

icizes school board and fire

No. 6:18-00532,

department board on Face-

2019 WL 4282696

book post.

(W.D. La. Sept. 10,
2019).

No

No

N/A
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CASE

SPEECH

PURSUANT

PUBLIC

PICKERING BALANCING

TO JOB

CONCERN?

TEST?

DUTIES?
Ryan v. Santa Clara

Public transportation law-

Valley Transp.

yer fired for posting

Auth., No. 16-CV-

“any[body] but [X] for city

04032-LHK, 2017

council” on Facebook. X

WL 3142130 (N.D.

was an agency employee

Cal July 25, 2017).

who was also on the city

No

Yes

N/A

No

No

N/A

No

No

N/A

No

council and known to be a
marginal employee.
Sampson v. City of

Officer posted on Facebook

Fort Smith, 255 F.

regarding discriminatory

Supp. 3d 873 (W.D.

practices within depart-

Ark. 2017).

ment.

Snyder v. Mil-

Student teacher posts

lersville Univ., No.

“drunken pirate” picture on

07-1660, 2008 WL

MySpace page.

5093140 (E.D. Pa.
2008).
Spanierman v.

Teacher interacts inappro-

No - except

N/A - but would have

Hughes, 576 F.

priately with students on

for an anti-

failed, disruption would

Supp. 2d 292 (D.

MySpace page.

war poem

have outweighed First

that played

Amendment value of

no role in

speech.

Conn 2008).

decision to
dismiss.
Thiede v. Burcroff,
No. 16-13650, 2018
WL 465968 (E.D.
Mich. Jan. 18, 2018).

Employee internal texts.

No

No

N/A
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PURSUANT TO

PUBLIC

PICKERING BALANCING

JOB DUTIES?

CONCERN?

TEST?

Vincent v. Story Co.,

Employee in county at-

No. 4:12-cv-00157-

torney’s office “likes”

No

Yes

Failed - speech adversely
impacted working rela-

RAW, 2014 WL

Facebook post that is

tionships between county

10007079 (S.D. Iowa

highly critical of findings

attorney, local police and

Jan. 14, 2014).

clearing local police of-

attorney general offices.

ficers in the shooting of a
family member.
Wudtke v. Bieber,

Police officer confronts

No. 16-C-260, 2017

sheriff candidate at cam-

presented that under-

WL 2274475 (E.D.

paign picnic and asks

mined Wudke’s effec-

Wis. May 24, 2017).

questions, later responds

tiveness.

to candidate’s Facebook
post regarding the encounter. When candidate
wins, officer ultimately
must resign.

No

Yes

Passed - no evidence
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